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'When you go into a hospital, you should be safer than when
you step onto an airplane. "1
I.

INTRODUCTION

David Lawrence is not the first member of the medical
establishment to compare the risks of being a patient in a
hospital to the risks of being a passenger on an airplane flight. 2
The chief operating officer of the Veterans Administration's vast
health care system recently made similar public statements.3 In
1. Tom Abate, Kaiser CEO Warns About Drug Errors, S.F. CHRON., June 30,
1999, at B1 (quoting David Lawrence, CEO, Kaiser Permanente). David Lawrence's
comments in his speech to biotechnology industry executives were repeated the next
month at a National Press Club Newsmaker Luncheon, where he was quoted as
saying, "[O]ne can conclude that the third-leading cause of death in the United
States are [sic] fatal accidents that result from [medical errors]. These accidents are
responsible for over 400,000 deaths each year, more than tobacco, stroke, diet,
alcohol, drugs, firearms or automobile accidents ...." National Press Club
Newsmaker Luncheon with Dr. David Lawrence, CEO, Kaiser Permanente, FED.
NEWS SERVICE, July 14, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File.
2. At a hearing addressing Veterans Administration medical care, Lucian
Leape of the Harvard School of Public Health asked, "Why is it that when you enter
a hospital, your chances of dying from an accident are 1 in 200, but when you climb
on an airplane, your chances of dying in an accident are 1 in two million[?]" VA
Medical Care: Hearing of the Health Subcomm. of the House Veterans' Affairs
Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Lucian Leape, Harvard School of Public
Health) [hereinafter Hearing, statement of Lucian Leape], available in LEXIS, News
Library, Transcripts File (discussing the VA:s efforts to prevent patient injury).
3. In 1997, Kenneth W. Kizer, then Under Secretary for Health, Department
of Veterans' Affairs, in testimony before Congress spoke of systems redesign as a
means of increasing patient safety. See Prepared Statement of Kenneth W. Kizer,
M.D., M.P.H., Under Secretary for Health, Dep't of Veterans' Affairs Before the House
Veterans' Affairs Comm. Health Subcomm. on VA's Risk Management Policies, FED.
NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File
(describing the VA:s new error prevention systems, including the creation of a Risk
Management Oversight Committee and increased evaluative functions of tho
existing Office of the Medical Inspector). On May 14, 1999, Leape; Kizer; Robert
Simon, Ed.D., C.P.E., Chief Scientist, Crew Performance Group, Dynamics Research
Corporation; and Senator Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) participated in a discussion of the
National Health Policy Forum, which addressed opportunities for a systems-based
approach to error reduction and considered how the aviation approach of
"restructuring the delivery environment and retraining" might be applied to improve
patient safety. See Reducing Medical Error: Can You Be as Safe in a Hospital as You
Are in a Jet?, NAT'LHEALTHPOL'¥F., May 14, 1999, at 2.
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1998, a Presidential Commission suggested that the Federal
Aviation Safety Reporting System4 was a possible model for
developing a "blame-free system of error reporting., that would
identify and help prevent the reoccurrence of errors in the health
care system.5 With this new emphasis on preventing patient
injury and the metaphor of "safe" airline travel has come a new
way of conceptualizing the causes of patient injury: "systems
errors" and "systems thinking."
The "systems" approach to patient injury grew out of a
seminal multidisciplinary study of malpractice in New York
State in the 1980s,6 when "no fault" was thought to be one
possible solution to the "malpractice crisis."7 The most significant
4. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is an "incident reporting
program designed to identify issues and hazards existing or emerging in the national
aviation system ... [and] is administered by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under a
management and funding agreement initiated in 1975." FAA Wake Vortex
Regulations: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Technology, Environment and Aviation
of the House Comm. on Science, Technology and Space, 103d Cong. (1994) (statement
of William Reynard, Director, Aviation Safety Reporting System), auailable in 1994
WL 14190976. The reports are analyzed by a contractor, Battelle Memorial
Institute, which is a research institution that employs retired aviation professionals.
See id.
5. See THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM'N ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
QUALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY, QUALITY FIRST: BETTER HEALTH CARE
FOR ALL AMERICANS, FINAL REP. TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 155
(1998) [hereinafter PREsiDENT'S COMM'N REP.] (calling for a national effort by
federal, state, and local governments, health care professionals and workers,
employers, health plans, consumers, unions, and others to improve and sustain the
quality of health care in the United States).
6. See HARVARD MED. PRAC. STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIG. AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK
(1990) (providing empirical data under contract for the State of New York in order to
inform the debate surrounding the malpractice liability system). The study had four
main components: a measure of the incidence of injuries resulting from medical
intervention, an estimate of the number of claims borne of such injury, a calculation
of the costs suffered by injured victims, and an estimate of the CA1:ent to which a
threat of litigation affected patient injury. See id. at 1-2; see also Troyen A. Brennan
et al., Incidence ofAdverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of
the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. I\IED. 370, 383 (1991);
Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients:
Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II, 324 NEW ENG. J. I\IED. 377, 377,
383 (1991) [hereinafter Leape et al., The Nature ofAdverse Events].
7. See, e.g., Larry M. Pollack, Medical Maloccurrence Insurance fMMIJ: A
First-Party, No-Fault Insurance Proposal for Resolving the Medical Malpractice
Controversy, 23 TORTS & INS. L.J. 552, 552-53 (1988) (proposing a "patient-derived
(first-party) 'no-fault' insurance system to compensate victims of iatrogenic
maloccurrence, regardless of negligence," that would require patients to buy an
insurance policy for a particular course of treatment or operation and under which
the patient would be covered for any treatment-related adverse medical outcome
regardless of negligence or fault on the part of the health care providers); see also,
e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and
Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 56, 82-113 (1998) (repor~g on "no fault" as "a
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finding of that study was that patient injuries deemed by health
care professionals to be caused by substandard care resulted in
almost no malpractice litigation.8 With special legislation
authorizing the study,9 the researchers were able to examine the
records of patients in nonpsychiatric hospitals in the entire state
of New York. 10 Based upon "chart reviews" performed by nurses,
medical-records analysts, and physicians, the researchers were
able to estimate the medical error rate among hospitalized
patients. 11 The principal investigator of the study, Lucian Leape
of the Harvard Public Health School, has become the leading
spokesman for the patient safety movement in the media, 12
professional journals,13 and other public forums. 14 Leape testified
leading alternative to today's liability systems for resolving medically caused
injuries" and discussing the Virginia and Florida no-fault legislation enacted in the
late 1980s for medical injuries).
8. See A Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and
Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III,
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 247 (1991) (reporting that the probability that injuries
caused by medical negligence would lead to litigation was only 1.53%).
9. See Act of July 8, 1986, ch. 266, 1986 N.Y. Laws 2021, 2046.
10. See Brennan et al., supra note 6, at 370.
1L See id. at 370, 372.
12. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, Diagnosing Medical Errors, WASH. POST.,
Nov. 19, 1996 (Health Magazine), at 12 (quoting Leape and referring to him as a
"nationally respected expert on the problems of medical errors"); Richard A Knox,
'Collegial' Monitoring of Hospitals Hit, BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 1999, at A1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File (quoting Leape and referring to him
as "perhaps the most prominent advocate nationally of a non-punitive approach to
quality improvement"); Patricia Neighmond, Sounds Like Science: Study Shows
Drug Errors in Hospitals Could Be Drastically Reduced If Pharmacists Were Made
Part of Medical Teams (National Public Radio broadcast, July 24, 1999), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsgroup File (discussing a study conducted by Leape, "a
longtime analyst of medical mistakes," in which he concluded that adding a
pharmacist to a hospital medical team resulted in a two-thirds drop in prescription
error).
13. See, e.g., Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1852 (1994)
[hereinafter Leape, Error in Medicine] (stating that "if physicians, nurses,
pharmacists, and administrators are to succeed in reducing errors in hospital care,
they will need to fundamentally change the way they think about errors and why
they occur"); Lucian L. Leape et al., Promoting Patient Safety by Preventing Medical
Error, 280 JAMA 1444, 1445, 1447 (1998) (critiquing error analysis, presenting four
examples of current efforts to promote patient safety, and calling for the conversion
of a "culture of blame that hides information about risk and error into a culture of
safety that flushes information out and enables us to prevent or quickly recover from
mistakes before they become patient injury").
14. See, e.g., Hearing, statement of Lucian Leape, supra note 2 (presenting
his error-reduction methodology and evaluating the VA's new risk management
policy); see also Peter Mayberry, Medication Errors: Is Unit-Dose Packaging the
Solution?, PHARMACEUTICAL & MED. PACKAGING NEWS MAG. (Feb. 1998)
<http://www.devicelink.com/pmpn/archive/98/021003.html> (reporting that Leape
testified at a public hearing of the Federal Drug Administration on the issue of
medication error and the roles of government and industry in solving the problem).
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before the recent President's Commission on Consumer Quality,
and the Commission's Final Report cited his work as evidence of
"unacceptably high error rates" in health care. 16 Within the last
decade, "patient safety" has truly come of age. 16
This Article does not propose to argue that the medical
liability system, criminal prosecution of health care
professionals, or even disciplinary actions against professionals
will in fact make health care safer. This Article suggests that
there is no evidence to prove that the mere threat of civil or
criminal liability or disciplinary action is the key vector
inhibiting new approaches to injury prevention under the rubric
of "systems thinking." There is in fact a disconnect between the
new rhetoric of systems thinking about medical error and legal
scholarship on the health care system that remains preoccupied
with the issue ofmedicalliability.
To develop a new framework for the role of law in enhancing
patient safety, this Article proposes a different paradigm than
the liability model. An examination of how law interacts with
public health should be the starting point for framing the legal
analysis of patient safety.17 This framing of the issues
15. See PREsiDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 5, at 23.
16. In late November 1999, the Institute of Medicine issued its report on
medical error. See COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System {Linda Kohn et al.
eds., National Academy Press, Advance Copy, Nov. 1999) [hereinafter To Err Is
Human]. Lucian Leape and David Lawrence were both members of the committee
issuing the report. See id. at iii. Not surprisingly, aviation safety was viewed as the
standard. See id. at 4. On December 7, 1999, President Clinton asked the Quality
Interagency Coordination Task Force to develop recommendations regarding patient
safety within sixty days. See Memorandum on Improving Health Care Quality and
Ensuring Patient Safety, 35 WEEKLY CO!IIl'. PRES. Doc. 2530-31 (Dec. 7, 1999),
available at <http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.goV>. Several members of ~ngress have
already introduced bills to promote patient safety. See Marilyn Webber Serafini, To
Err Is . . . Reason for a New Law, 32 NA'l"L J. 45 (Jan. 1, 2000), available at
<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>.
17. Donald A Schon has written extensively about the general problem of bow
professionals and policy makers frame issues. See generally DONALD A SCHON, THE
REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983)
[hereinafter SCHON, REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER] (suggesting that professionals
know more about their practice than they are at times able to articulate and
analyzing and systematizing these intuitive acts with the goal of promoting a
"reflective practice"); DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION:
TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES (1994)
(challenging the prevailing notion that contemplative, reflective thinking is out of
place in the "common sense" arena of policy making and advocating "design
rationality," a rational approach to concrete problems that includes "higher-level"
reflection). For an application of a Schon-like analysis to a problem of law and
medicine, see Joseph J. Fins & :Matthew D. Bacchetta, Framing the Physician·
Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Active Euthanasia Debate: The Role of Deontology,
Consequentialism, and Clinical Pragmatism, 43 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOCY 563, 563
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acknowledges that the liability model may have a role to play in
error reduction, but that this role should be determined by more
empirical study of the law and legal institutions as part of the
overall emerging system of patient safety.
In proposing a new framework for the legal debate of patient
safety, this Article does not offer a single solution to the patient
safety problem. Hidden behind any proposed solution is a host of
questions that have not yet been answered: What is "patient
safety"? What is "systems thinking" about patient injury? And
most important, what role, if any, do legal institutions need to
play in promoting systemic approaches to injury prevention
within health care organizations?
Part II of this Article defines the concepts or constructs that
frame the debate: patient safety, systems thinking, medical
liability, and public health law. Part III explores "comparative
institutional analysis" 18 and proposes that systems thinking
about injury prevention creates new kinds of professional
knowledge. Surprisingly, this type of knowledge is embedded in
organizations, not individuals, as assumed by the model of
professional liability for patient injury. 19 Part IV uses the dual
lens of public health law and comparative institutional analysis
to resolve problems in regulation, disciplinary procedures,
criminal prosecution, and conducting research on patient safety
under existing legal structures. Until systems thinking about
preventing patient injury is widespread throughout both the
legal and health care systems, it will be important to think of
(1995).
18. See NEIL K KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PuBLIC POLICY 3 (1994) (elucidating tho
concept of"comparative institutional analysis," which refers to the way that decision
making authority is allocated to and among complex institutional processes, such as
the political process, the market process, and the adjudicative process, and
analyzing the choice among these alternatives). For examples of applications of
comparative institutional analysis to problems in law and medicine, see Larry I.
Palmer, Institutional Analysis and Physicians' Rights After Vacco v. Quill, 7
CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'y 415, 415, 418 (1998) (proposing that the arguments in
Vacco v. Quill, in which the Court allowed the criminal prosecution of physicians for
assisting patient suicides, can be read through the lens of comparative institutional
analysis and, specifically, "an analysis of two basic social institutions: law and
medicine"). For a more explicit positivist approach to institutional analysis in law,
see Neil MacCormick, Institutions and Laws Again, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1429, 1429
(1999).
19. See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang, Patient Injury Incentives in Law, 17 YALE L. &
POL'y REV. 1, 5 (1998) (providing an "overview of the common law of tort and
contract and the statutory regime that have together created incentives for MCOs
[managed care organizations] to minimize care while exposing physicians to, on tho
one hand, patient injury liability and, on the other, unfettered termination power in
the hands of the MCO"); E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical
Practice and Medical Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2000).
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ways of reducing the legal risks to nurses and other health care
professionals who are still "blamed" by legal actors for what
scholars label "systems errors."
To discover the appropriate role of law in the prevention of
medical errors, this Article concludes that legal scholars must
learn to pose empirical questions about how various institutions
interact with the health care system. Some of these questions
will involve issues related to the medical liability system, but the
proposed interdisciplinary research will be informed by a public
health law perspective and will necessitate new methodologies.
II. PATIENT SAFETY AND SYSTEMS TIDNKING

"Patient safety" and "systems thinking" are terms used by
reformers to change health care delivery and the legal and
regulatory structure surrounding health care. Reformers are
motivated by visions that are often embedded in stories, rather
than by the crisp categorical definitions of relatively stable legal
or scientific constructs.20 The following Martin Memorial Hospital
case21 serves as a glimpse of such visions.
In December 1995, Ben Kolb's parents took him to Martin
Memorial Hospital for a routine surgical procedure.22 His heart
stopped during the procedure, and he died twenty-four hours
later.23 Less than one month after his death, Ben's family reached
a monetary settlement with the hospital and its insurance
20. See, e.g., Lawrence M. O'Rourke & Tom Hamburger, "Got·ernment by
Anecdote": In Managed-Care Debate, 1\fiNN. STAR TRIB., July 2, 1999, at A12
(reporting that to push through their managed health care legislation in Congress,
Democrats are "telling horror stories about ordinary people hurt by the decisions of
their health insurance plans," including a story about a woman who fell off a cliff,
was knocked unconscious, and was taken by helicopter to a hospital emergency room
where she was turned away because she had not called in advance to ensure that
her HMO would pay the bill).
21. This story was widely reported in the media at the time. See, e.g., Lisa
Belkin, How Can We Saue the Next Vzctim?, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1997, § 6
(Magazine), at 28; Boodman, supra note 12, at 12. This story was also told by the
hospital through its Director of Corporate Risk Management. See Doni Haas, In
Memory of Ben, RISK MGMT. REP., Dec. 1998, at 1, 1.
22. See Haas, supra note 21, at 1 (noting that Ben needed some scar tissue
removed from his ear); see also Belkin, supra note 21, at 28 (relating that this was
Ben's third surgery on his ear).
23. Moments after what was thought to be a local anesthetic had been injected
inside and behind Ben's ear, his heart rate and blood pressure increased alarmingly.
See Belkin, supra note 21, at 28. He was stabilized, but shortly thereafter his heart
rate and blood pressure dropped abruptly. See id. Doctors performed CPR on him for
an hour and forty minutes. See id. Subsequently his heart began to beat again with
the aid of a pacemaker. See Haas, supra note 21, at 2. Ben was in a coma for
approximately 24 hours, after which time it was agreed that Ben was brain dead and
the ventilator should be removed. See Belkin, supra note 21, at 28.
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carrier.24 What was unusual about this case was that the
hospital's risk manager did not accept as the cause of death the
coroner's preliminary assessment of idiosyncratic reaction to the
anesthesia. 25 Rather, the risk manager conducted a thorough
investigation, which revealed that Ben had been injected with
the wrong drug after a mix-up of two different drugs in the
operating room. 26 After those findings were confirmed by two
independent laboratories,27 the hospital's risk manager,
accompanied by the anesthesiologist present at Ben's surgery,
shared the results with the family and its lawyer. 28
Although the amount of the compensation paid to Ben's
family is confidential, 29 the anesthesiologist, the hospital's
lawyer, the insurance company's representative, the hospital's
risk manager, and the family's lawyer have all publicly described
their collaborative process as aimed at making Martin Memorial
Hospital a safer place while dealing fairly with this tragic
accident. 30 The candid and quick disclosure of the results of the
error in this particular hospital's method of handling drugs led to
a surprising outcome. The parents were able to question their
son's caregivers and felt comfortable continuing to use Martin
Memorial Hospital for health care services. 31
24. See Belkin, supra note 21, at 28.
25. See Boodman, supra note 12, at 12 (noting that the coroner found this type
of reaction to be "extremely rare").
26. Knowing that Ben's reaction occurred immediately after the injection of
lidocaine with epinephrine, hospital staff secured the two syringes, a partially filled
vial of the drug solution, and an empty vial of adrenaline. See Haas, supra note 21,
at 3. The risk manager asserted that all syringes and vials were maintained and
blood samples were kept in case additional testing was necessary. See id. She later
held several meetings and the possibility of a mix-up of the two drugs was explored.
See id. at 4. The risk manager was eventually able to reconstruct how the drugs left
the pharmacy and were tracked through every step of the process. See id.
27. Tests were performed at the University of Georgia and at National Medical
Services in Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, using different testing techniques. See
Haas, supra note 21, at 3-5. Both labs found that the syringe contained a topical
adrenaline instead of an anesthetic. See id.
28. See id. at 6.
29. See Boodman, supra note 12, at 12 (stating that the parties agreed to keep
the amount of the settlement secret, but that the payment exceeded $250,000,
Florida's statutory maximum for noneconomic damages).
30. For example, in October 1996, a panel discussion of the Martin Memorial
Hospital case was the centerpiece of the discussions at a conference addressing ways
to reduce medical errors, which was organized by the American Medical Association,
the Joint Commission on Accreditation ofHealthcare Organizations, and others. See
Doug Levy, Helping Hospitals Learn from Tragic Mistakes, USA TODAY, Nov. 5,
1996, at 6D. For a thorough recounting of her personal role as the chief investigator
of this incident, see Haas, supra note 21.
3L See Belkin, supra note 21, at 28 (commenting that the risk manager was
"grateful and amazed" at the parents' reaction).
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More important, the hospital acknowledged not only to the
family, but also to its professional peers, that it had changed its
methods of handling drugs. 32 Interestingly enough, no
professional was disciplined or sued.33 In the lingo of the current
reform movement, the death of Ben Kolb was the result of a
"latent system" failure in the way drugs were labeled,
distributed, and handled in the hospital.34 From this very
inspiring story of professionals working together, it is apparent
that for reformers, systems thinking means conceptualizing the
"mistake" in terms of the interaction of all the human actors and
the technology from the point at which both drugs were delivered
to the hospital pharmacy to the fatal injection of the wrong
drug.35
Patient safety means developing processes, such as
eliminating one of the steps in the drug delivery procedure, in
order to decrease the likelihood that the same mistake will be
made in the future. 36 Not mentioned by the reformers but implicit
in the outcome is the willingness of a health care organization,
namely Martin Memorial Hospital, to pay enough compensation
to satisfy the family and pay their attorney's fees so that no
lawsuits were filed against any of the individual professionals
arguably involved. The Martin Memorial Hospital case arrives at
32. See Haas, supra note 21, at 5 (revealing that the hospital was no longer
using intermediate containers, which allowed the opportunity for the wrong drug to
be drawn into an end-use container, but that the hospital now uses a filter straw,
which allows for transfer of the drug directly from the vial to the end-use container);
see also Boodman, supra note 12, at 12 (reporting other changes in drug-handling
procedures, including that drugs are now transferred one at a time, t\vo nurses must
observe the transfer and verify the contents, topical adrenaline is never drawn into a
syringe, and no vials can be discarded until surgery is over and the patient is stable).
33. See Boodman, supra note 12, at 12 (noting that the nurses involved in Ben's
death are still working at the hospital and that all had unblemished records).
34. In a statement made at the October 1996 conference on ways to reduce
medical errors, the Kolb family's lawyers indicated that they were e.A"Ploring a
products liability claim against the manufacturers despite the settlement with the
hospital: "In representing this family, we try to make a difference. From a products
liability standpoint, even though our investigation is in its infancy, we have
developed some theories that we think together will make a change in the way the
medications commonly used together, are packaged and sold." Statement of the Law
firm of Krupnick, Campbell, Malone, Roselli, Buser, Slama & Hancock (on file with
the author and the Houston Law Review).
35. See, e.g., Leape, Error in Medicine, supra note 13, at 1854 (stating that
"responsible individuals at each stage [must] think through the consequences of
their decisions and . . . reason back from discovered deficiencies to redesign and
reorganize the process").
36. See id. (reasoning that to create a safe process requires attention to
methods of error reduction at each stage of system development); see also Belkin,
supra note 21, at 28 (discussing the flawed procedure in the l\fartin Memorial
Hospital case and stating that "[t]he elimination of one step eliminates one
opportunity for the human factor to get in the way").
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a kind of contractual no-fauW 7 solution by which the family of an
injured patient is adequately compensated, no individual health
care professional is sued, and the health care organization takes
systemic steps within its organization to prevent similar
accidents and shares its "learning" with other health care
providers. However, legal scholarship is not built upon visions, so
systems thinking and patient safety could mean numerous things
to lawyers, and this engenders the problem of definitions.

A. Patient Safety, Medical Error, and Prevention of Injury
Patient safety advocates and tort reform theorists have their
respective notions of safety, as well as related notions of medical
error and prevention of injury. Patient safety advocates'
definitions emphasize the processes of health care: patient safety
is "the avoidance, prevention, and amelioration of adverse
outcomes or InJuries stemming from the processes of
healthcare."38 The adverse outcomes or injuries include "errors,"
"deviations," and "accidents."39
Modern tort theorists, on the other hand, have an explicit
concern with the "safety" of the health system, but aim their
analyses at the legal system's response to actual adverse patient
outcomes. Starting with the seminal works of law-and-economics
scholars such as Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner, most modern
tort theorists acknowledge that there is a connection between
safety-prevention of future injuries-and other goals, such as the
compensation of injured patients. 40 Within this tradition of legal
reformist scholarship, patient safety is defined in terms of the costs
and benefits of preventing the injury, presumably in some general
or systemic sense.41 The liability system only deals with those
medical errors that result in injury and are the subject of lawsuits
or the threat of lawsuits. The hope of this modern analysis is that a
37. Refer to supra note 7 (discussing the no-fault system for compensating
victims of medically caused injuries).
38. National Patient Safety Foundation at the American Medical Association,
Agenda for Research and Development in Patient Safety (last modified May 24, 1999)
<http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci.npsf/research/research.htm>.
39. See id.
40. See KOMESAR, supra note 18, at 154 (discussing Judge Calabresi's work,
which has recognized that there is a "trade·off between the costs of unprevented
harm and the costs of preventing that harm"). Judge Posner expanded upon Judge
Calabresi's ideas, arguing that "the logic of negligence law could be found in resource
allocation efficiency and economic analysis." See id. at 155.
41. See, e.g., id. at 155 (discussing safety in terms of the famous Judge Learned
Hand formula, which defines negligence in terms of costs and benefits of prevention:
if the burden of taking the safety step is greater than the probability of mishap
multiplied by the loss if the mishap occurs (B < p x L), then there is negligence).
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"rational" response to patient injury will influence health care
providers to develop "safer" practices.
The apparent conflict between the tort theorists' and the
advocates' definitions of safety is resolved by one of the critics of
the law-and-economics approach to tort reform. Neil Komesar
notes that tort reformers focus solely on the process of
adjudication-the liability model-and its many limitations.42
Discovery of a limitation in the liability model-for instance, that
it does not adequately deter future injury-leads tort reformers
to suggest modifications of judicial liability doctrines or
legislative modification of liability systems, such as statutory
limits on the amount of damages that can be recovered or even
no-fault patient compensation.43 Tort reformers fail to consider
that legislative tinkering with the liability system will
necessarily create another imperfect solution to the patient
safety problem. For Komesar, the important issue is to try to
determine which legal or nonlegal institutions achieve the
socially optimal level of patient safety and health care!• He
posits that resolving that issue requires a comparison of the
strengths and weaknesses of imperfect institutional processes of
enhancing safety in the health care system:
Safety is a goal choice; tort liability is a law or public
policy choice. No goal choice standing on its own dictates
law or public policy choices. The goal of safety is
consistent with a wide variety of law and public policy
choices.... Put in institutional terms, depending on the
setting, optimal safety might be achieved by tort liability
through the adjudicative process, by regulation through
the political process, or by transactions through the
market process. The link between goals and law and
public policy results is institutional choice.":;
Komesar's insight allows for acceptance of the social goal of
patient safety as envisioned by the Martin Memorial Hospital
case, while bearing in mind the problem of determining the
appropriate institutional arrangement for optimizing safety
within health care.
See id. at 154-56.
See PAUL C. WEILER, 1:1EDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 31-32, 70-92, 13258 (1991) (exploring the prevention impact of malpractice litigation as well as
discussing statutory limits on damages and detailing and endorsing no-fault patient
compensation).
44.
See KOMESAR, supra note 18, at 6, 153-55 (discussing the application of his
general research question of whether "the market is better or worse than its
available alternatives or the political process is better or worse" to safety issues}.
45. Id. at 155.
42.
43.
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Distinguishing patient safety as a social goal from the choice
of a legal or nonlegal strategy to achieve that goal clarifies the
definitional issues in the term "medical error." Lucian Leape uses
medical error to refer to a broad category of phenomena. 46 At one
level, the term clearly encompasses those events that lead to
patient injury, as in the Martin Memorial Hospital case.47 But it
also includes routine, nonconsequential errors: Leape and his
colleagues use medical error to mean those mishaps or deviations
from proper practice that do not result in substantial harm, let
alone a lawsuit.48 For example, a physician writes a prescription
for a one-percent solution of a drug, but the pharmacist misreads
the physician's handwriting and prepares a ten-percent solution.
The nurse who is to administer the medication notices the
unusually high concentration and brings her concern to the
attention of the prescribing physician. The prescribing physician
then corrects the dosage. Under prevailing practices in most
health care organizations in this country, there is no formal
reporting of this "near miss." However, to the safety prevention
researcher this would be important data to collect in order to
reduce or prevent the number of drug medication "errors" in
hospitals and nursing homes. 49
Responding to the near miss might be thought of as an
aspect of quality improvement,50 but to confuse the safety
problem in medicine with the current debate on improving
quality in health care ignores the dynamic potential of the public
safety advocates. To paraphrase Justice Stewart's famous
observation about obscenity,51 we do not know what patient
safety is because we do not yet have a method to translate
information about reported patient injuries into meaningful
strategies for detecting near misses and deviations from safe
protocols that do not result in patient injury. The airline
46. See Leape, Error in Medicine, supra note 13, at 1853-57 (describing errors
committed because of skill level, misperception, lack of knowledge, system design,
poor maintenance, and inadequate management).
47. See id. at 1851-52.
48. See id. at 1851 (stating that "most errors do no harm" because the error is
intercepted or the patient's natural defenses prevent injury).
49. See id. (advocating a national error-reporting system that would include
near misses as a way to improve health care safety).
50. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 5, at 155-59 (calling for the
establishment of an error-reporting system modeled in part on the Aviation Safety
Reporting System). "A system of continuous quality improvement committed to
preventing [medical] errors and correcting them when they do occur is a vital step in
improving the quality of care in the United States." Id. at 156. Refer to note 16

supra.
51. "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
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metaphor for patient safety is merely a reminder that there may
be systems of error reporting, regulation, adjudication, and
implementation of technological innovations that can change the
"safety record" of health care. At the moment, however, there is
no evidence that the type of institutional arrangement in place to
promote safety in aviation or other industries could, or more
important should, be applied to health care.
To ensure that these important questions remain open,
patient safety is defined as follows: the continuous efforts of
actors within the institutions of medicine and law to reduce the
level of iatrogenic patient injury62 through the systemic
understanding of how errors are reduced. This definition of
patient safety has two features that distinguish it from the
definitions of safety proposed by both patient safety advocates
and tort reformers. First, I join with Komesar in recognizing
patient safety as a worthwhile social goal that could be pursued
through a variety oflegal and nonlegal institutions.63 Second, the
definition acknowledges the need for a new understanding of all
the potential risks that never come to the attention of either
medical or legal officials, but it does not explicitly embrace the
patient safety advocates' position that aviation or any other
industry provides the model for reduction of risks in health care.
The patient safety advocates' position can be contrasted with
that of the tort reformists' by comparing their respective views of
the world of errors.

Tort reformers, according to Komesar, analyze only the tip of
the iceberg to make pronouncements about safety and law.M
52. Paul Weiler defines medical or iatrogenic injury as "an UDeA"}lected or
avoidable adverse event, as opposed to an inevitable or anticipated traumatic
byproduct of necessary treatment." Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical
Liability, 52 :Mn. L. REv. 908, 912 n.22 (1993).
53. Refer to notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
54. See Ko:MESAR, supra note 18, at 154-56.
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Under their view, the sinking of the Titanic provides an
opportunity to discuss the positive or ill effects of imposing
liability on ship owners as a means of preventing future mishaps
with icebergs. Patient safety advocates argue that icebergs are
always a risk of boating, so the first tool of prevention would be
the development of a system of near misses of ships running into
icebergs. The essential assumption behind this theory, which
compels acknowledgement, is that near misses are very similar
to actual accidents such as the Titanic hitting an iceberg. The
patient safety advocates, however, do not have a theory of health
care as delivered through complex organizations rather than by a
mechanical system steered by the physician and his or her
underlings.
B. Medical Liability as a System of Prevention

To be open to the lack of a role for traditional malpractice
liability in the patient safety issue, one must also acknowledge
the equal possibility that there is such a relationship. Even prior
to the Harvard Medical Practice Study, leading law-andeconomics scholars had noted a relationship between the
possibility of tort liability and safety. 55 Other scholars may
question this relationship,56 but one need not resolve this
longstanding debate. Both sides of the debate bring forth a prior
ideological commitment that is often invisible and clearly not yet
adopted as a matter of public policy. The more important point is
to elucidate the social goals, matters of law, and public policy
choices of medical liability.
The legal scholars associated with the Harvard Medical
Practice Study have argued that the medical liability system's
goals of redistributing the costs of accidents and providing
incentives for accident prevention could be better achieved

55. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 17-20 (1970) (recognizing that liability under accident law is
used to balance safety and economic cost); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 73 (1972) (observing that "[t]he rules of liability
seem to have been broadly designed to bring about the efficient ... level of accidents
and safety").
56. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO
HEALTH CARE? 384-89 (1997) (questioning the tort liability system's capability to
efficiently process claims, which negatively affects its capacity for deterrence). For a
critique of Epstein's views on malpractice, see Gary T. Schwartz, Medical
Malpractice, Tort, Contract, and Managed Care, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 885
(concluding that Epstein's contract recommendations in malpractice situations is
innovative yet fails to consider the "dramatic" modern movement towards managed
care).
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through a system of "no fault. ,:;7 By positing two social goalscompensation and prevention-no-fault advocates can engage in
a kind of "balancing" to form their policy recommendation of
eliminating liability for medical injuries in the interest of
promoting or optimizing patient safety.68 This type of cost-benefit
analysis is appealing because it is the kind of analysis judges
often do when they manipulate tort doctrines, even in the
medical malpractice context.59
The no-fault analysis, however, is not useful to the patient
safety debate for two reasons. First, the patient safety movement
(if indeed it is a social movement) posits only one goal: prevention
of injuries. When translated into a law or public policy position,
this means that the issue of compensation is set aside without
losing sight of the fact that compensation might be important to
others, such as potential consumers of health care and the
plaintiffs trial bar whose fees are usually paid from the recovery
of damages.60 In the actual political process, there might be some
compromise between measures designed for prevention and those
aimed at compensation, but from an analytical standpoint, safety
is the only goal. How to achieve safety through political action or
regulatory changes of health care is yet another question. The nofault balancing reform confuses social goals with analyses of the
processes of change-the political process.
Second, the evidence available from studies of limited nofault systems for medical accidents indicates that the complete
elimination of litigation of claims is nearly impossible.61 Virginia
and Florida both enacted legislation in the late 1980s designed to
57. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 43, at 134-50 {arguing that a no-fault system
would provide wider and more generous compensation, result in significant savings
in administrative costs, and retain adequate deterrence and preventative
incentives).
58. See, e.g., id. at 149 (positing that the "prevention role" of a program will
give health care organizations an incentive to learn about and correct injuries and
their causes rather than simply blaming errant individuals through malpractice
litigation).
59. See, e.g., Areta v. Avedon, 585 P.2d 598, 607 {Cal. 1993) {applying a costbenefit analysis in an informed consent action and holding that a doctor was not
required to inform a cancer patient of his statistical life eA"}lectancy); KOMESAR,
supra note 18, at 155-56 (appropriating Judge Hand's classic cost-benefit formula to
support his thesis of the "link [between] negligence liability, resource allocation
efficiency, and safety").
60. See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 7, at 72-73 {noting that a no-fault system
could reduce compensation by eliminating punitive damages, payment for
nonpecuniary loss, and lump sum recoveries, which would ultimately result in lower
attorney's fees).
6L See id. at 104 (observing that although a Florida no-fault system for
specific birth-related injuries reduced tort claims, "a substantial number" of
permanent injury and death tort claims were still filed).
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remove severe neurological injuries to newborns from the tort
system and place these cases in an administrative, no-fault
system. 62 Under both systems, parents of injured babies
continued to bring lawsuits for a number of reasons: the allegedly
insufficient compensation amounts, 63 the varied interpretations
of courts allowing for suits to be filed, 64 and the general
narrowness of the provisions. 65 This multiple-goals analysis of
medical liability indicates that the political process must finetune any so-called reforms. 66
Once we focus on the social goal of prevention, it is apparent
that other systems could be sources of prevention tactics. During
the so-called malpractice crises of the 1970s and 1980s, certain
specialties had considerable difficulty obtaining insurance,
particularly obstetrics and anesthesiology. 67 Professionals in one
of these specialties-anesthesiology-decided to take steps to
reduce the cost of insurance by reducing the number of
accidents. 66 In 1984, the formation of the Anesthesia Patient
Safety Foundation (APSF) led to research and changes that
reduced the number of anesthetic-related accidents, which tend
to be extremely costly.69
The APSF's improvement of anesthesia safety is a good
example of Komesar's point that the "market" can have more
62. See id. at 82.
63. See id. at 90-93 (stating that the Virginia and Florida no-fault statutes lack
explicit nonpecuniary loss provisions and compensate claimants with scheduled,
rather than lump sum, payments).
64. See id. at 84-85, 89 (noting that although both the Florida and Virginia
statutes state "that no-fault is to be an exclusive remedy," the statutes allow judicial
review of administrative decisions and many claimants go directly to court to
determine if no fault replaces the tort remedy).
65. See id. at 90 (describing the statutory eligibility criteria as "very specific
and targeted" and "only a partial carve-out from tort").
66. See id. at 115 & n.294 (illustrating the recent amendments made to the
Florida no-fault statute that attempt to bring many tort cases back under the
statute).
67. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability
and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 40911 (1994).
68. See John H. Eichhorn et al., Standards for Patient Monitoring During
Anesthesia at Harvard Medical School, 256 JAMA 1017, 1017 (1986) (observing that
upon concern expressed by Harvard Medical School's insurance carrier over rising
claims related to anesthesia, Harvard appointed a risk management committee to
improve safety).
69. See Walter Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.)-Medical
Mishap Compensation (N.Z.), 73 CORNELL L. REv. 170, 186-87 & n.46 (1988) (noting
the successful effect of the APSFs error-prevention campaigns). For more
information on the APSF, see Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation, APSF
Foundation Information (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.gasnet.org/societies/
apsf/foundationlfoundation.html>.
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effect on safety than the law.70 It is not that law is irrelevant to
safety, but in the APSF example, the market responded without
any political change to incentives and disincentives to produce a
more "safe" environment.11 In fact, there has been growth in
knowledge about how to make the operating room safer by
changing the configuration of technology, human resources, and
methods of training anesthesiologists.72 Reaching the goal of
patient safety requires a paradigm shift in the way we think
about prevention of accidents in law. Rather than continue the
debate about liability as instrumental or as an obstacle to
increased safety in health care, we need to acknowledge that the
single goal of preventing patient injuries requires a new and
dynamic way of conceptualizing law so that knowledge about
safety will continue to grow. In this new view, medical liabilitythe imposition of civil liability for damages on health care
professionals and organizations-is acknowledged to be an
imperfect system for enhancing patient safety. The goal is not to
perfect or eliminate medical liability under the banner of
efficiency or rationality. Rather, the goal of a new
conceptualization of the role oflaw is to assess the capacity of the
legal system to adopt new ways of viewing safety.

C. Public Health Law and the Use of New Knowledge
To infuse the entire health care system with systemic
knowledge about reducing the risk of injuries to patients requires
a new paradigm: public health. Public health law, broadly
defined, is concerned with the well being of a given population.73
Although preventing the spread of infectious disease has
historically been the core function of public health, increasingly
the social and behavioral aspects of a "healthy lifestyle"opposing smoking, violence, and unprotected sexual intercourse
and promoting designated drivers-are part of the public health
agenda. 74 Some of the most dramatic safety increases in public
health are in fact simple but systemic changes; for example,
getting physicians to wash their hands after delivery has greatly

70. See KOMESAR, supra note 18, at 154.
7L See Gellhorn, supra note 69, at 186-87 & n.46 (noting a reduction in claims
against anesthesiologists even in the years preceding the APSF's establishment).
72. These developments are described in Abraham & Weiler, supra note 67, at
412-13.
73. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A
Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 59, 67
(1999).
74. See id. at 79-80.
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decreased infection and death associated with childbirth,76 and
good sewage systems have reduced the spread of disease. 711 In
addition, public health measures are based upon scientifically
derived data about the risks to health.77
Public health measures, by and large, become "law" through
legislatively authorized regulatory schemes and are thus
examples of how law reduces risks to overall health.78 As tools of
prevention, these regulatory measures are very different from
the supposed prevention function of tort liability as applied to
medicine. The tort liability system in medicine is best described
as a means by which private individuals attempt to exercise
control over medical professionals and health care organizations.
Public health is a means by which public officials, in cooperation
with citizens, seek to harness science and medicine to protect the

75. For an early illustration of systems thinking applied to medical care, see
generally the work of Hungarian physician, Ignaz Semmelweis (1818·1865), who
discovered the cause of puerperal ("childbed") fever and introduced antisepsis into
medical practice. See SHERWIN B. NULAND, DOCTORS: THE BIOGRAPHY OF MEDICINE
244-46 (1988). Semmelweis noted that poor women who gave birth in hospitals had a
much higher incidence of mortality than well-to-do women who gave birth at homo
or even others who self-delivered in alleyways and streets. See id. at 245.
Semmelweis followed the cause of the higher mortality rate back to the lack of hand
washing on the part of medical students and physicians performing the deliveries.
See id. at 246.
76. See Gostin et al., supra note 73, at 78-79 (describing the early sanitation
reformers' agenda that focused on sewer line improvement and stating that "purity
of water supplies" is an important traditional public health practice). For a
fictionalized account of a public health issue-contaminated public baths-and tho
professional and public reactions to remedying the problem, see Henrik Ibsen, An
Enemy of the People (1883), reprinted in HENRIK IBSEN, THE COMPLETE MAJOR
PROSE PLAYS 277-386 (RolfFjelde Trans., Farrar Straus Giroux, 1st ed. 1978).
77. In fact, when legislatures give public health officials the authority to
impose sanctions against individuals, the Constitution requires that there be n
scientific basis for legislative enactment of public health measures as exercises of tho
police power. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25, 30-31 (1905)
(holding that a state legislature is within its police power in establishing n public
health vaccination statute based upon an "effective" scientific theory). In Jacobson,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state law that authorized local
towns to require vaccination when necessary for public health and safety and
authorized a fine for adults who refused. See id. at 12-13, 39. An interesting aspect
of Jacobson is that, at the time, some medical professionals did not believe tho
particular vaccination that the state used prevented the spread of small pox. See id.
at 30. The Court stated that the legislature was entitled to choose among competing
theories of preventing the spread of the disease. See id.
78. It is important to distinguish between health and health care to
understand some of the issues, particularly the behavior issue, on the public health
agenda. For instance, decreasing the amount of smoking among a given population
raises the overall health status of that population without any increase in tho
amount of health care for lung cancer in that population. See, e.g., Lester Breslow &
William G. Cumberland, Progress and Objectives in Cancer Control, 259 JAMA 1690,
1690, 1692 (1988).
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health of the community.79 Although coercion is used, public
health relies heavily upon education and voluntary cooperation
as the primary means of obtaining compliance.80 Even though the
system of public health law regarding its core function of
preventing communicable disease is in disarray,81 a shift to a
public health paradigm highlights the unique problems of public
safety.
The risk to patient safety is not in some "disease" process
that can be studied and objectified by medical and public health
professionals. Rather, the subjects of study in patient safety are
health care professionals and the tools they choose to do their
work. Making health care the subject of intense scientific study is
not likely to be achieved without the voluntary cooperation of
professionals within the health care system.
III. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND
PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE

At the present time, knowledge about patient safety is in an
embryonic stage, but the larger universe of knowledge about risk
reduction is more developed. Systemic tbjnlcing about prevention
of patient injury requires the creation of new kinds of knowledge
that are embedded within organizations rather than individuals.
In health care organizations, the kind of knowledge that is
valued is "professional knowledge," meaning that it is derived
from some scientific body of knowledge.S2 Yet there is another
tradition of professionalism, less aligned with a positivist
interpretation, that the patient safety movement evokes. This
79. See, e.g., Gostin et al., supra note 73, at 61 (extolling the use of both
scientific inquiry and the law as methods by which norms of healthy behavior are
established).
80. See id. at 120.
8L See id. at 88-101 (discussing three challenges to health law's goal of
preventing communicable diseases: the decline in public health funding and
increasing public apathy, the emergence of new treatment-intensive communiCJJble
diseases, and the advent of managed care).
82. In describing this dominant mode of thinking about the nature of
professional knowledge as "technical rationality," Donald Schon provides a critique
of positivism. He writes:
Technical Rationality is the heritage of Positivism, the powerful
philosophical doctrine that grew up in the nineteenth century as an account
of the rise of science and technology and as a social movement aimed at
applying the achievements of science and technology to the well-being of
manlcind. Technical Rationality is the Positivist epistemology of practice.
SCHON, REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER, supra note 17, at 31. See generally id. at 22-69
(discussing the nature and limitations of "Technical Rationality," or instrumental,
science-based problem-solving, and proposing "Reflection-in-Action," an intuitive,
action-based method, as an alternative).
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other tradition of professionalism in health care is patientcentered and modernly places a great deal of emphasis on patient
autonomy. 83 This avocational aspect of caring for patients is best
epitomized in the notions of caring for the dying. 84 The patient
safety movement seeks to invoke this sense of professionalism in
encouraging health care professionals to question the adversarial
assumptions of the liability model and to speak the "truth" about
medical error.
Thus infused with the liability model, patient safety
advocates tend to see issues in terms of liability without
considering the variety of options available in law or public
policy. The regulation of health care is complex, and it is not
surprising that on close examination, the model of liability fails
to point to the correct empirical questions or to place the patient
safety movement into proper historical context. Most important,
the liability model fails to consider that many of the present legal
protections physicians and health care organizations enjoy may
in fact inhibit efforts to improve patient safety.
As an example, consider the relationship of the process of
accrediting health care facilities to the promotion of patient
safety. At present, the Joint Commission for Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) determines on a regular
basis if a hospital should be accredited, and it uses a nominally
"voluntary" process that certifies that the hospital meets certain
standards and is presumably "safe."85 But without JCAHO
accreditation, a hospital cannot receive payment from
government or private reimbursement programs, such as
83. See generally LARRY I. PALMER, LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 34·
38 (1989) (proposing an alternative to the informed consent model of physician·
patient decision making, which emphasizes a collaborative, rather than a
contractual, approach).
84. How this ethical objection is enforced within the legal system has created
considerable conceptual difficulties. See, e.g., Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys.
Corp., 728 A2d 166, 167, 171 (Md. 1999) (holding that the estate could not recover
damages from health care professionals for administering cardiopulmonary
resuscitation contrary to the written advance directive of an AIDS patient). Some of
the confusion is a function of trying to understand the nature of the "right" to refuse
treatment. The plaintiffs in Wright tried to argue that the patient had either a
common law, statutory, or constitutional right that the physician had ignored. See
id. at 167-68 (referencing Maryland's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, which governs
directives of health care). The court held in effect that this right was a function of
statutory enactment, and the lack of certification by two physicians that his
condition was "terminal," as required by the statute, was fatal to any claim of
negligence. See id. at 175.
85. See Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO), Joint Commission Mission and History (visited Jan. 20, 2000)
<http://www.jcaho.org/mandh_frm.html> (noting the voluntary nature of
accreditation).
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Medicare or indemnity health insurance programs.sa The JCAHO
in fact wields considerable power and is best thought of as a
quasi-political body. Not surprisingly, as the media have given
more attention to prevention of patient injury,87 the JCAHO has
modified its standards about reporting adverse incidents-what
are called "sentinel events."88 One recent change was the
implementation of a standard that encouraged healthcare
organizations to voluntarily provide the JCAHO with a copy of
the document analyzing the systemic cause or causes of the
sentinel event, called a "root cause analysis," along with
corrective plans.89
Some professional organizations with seats on the JCAHO
board objected to this policy on the grounds that once disclosed,
these reports might be discoverable in a future lawsuit by the
injured party.90 One might wonder why giving a patient an
explanation of why he or she was injured along with the steps the
hospital is taking to prevent future occurrences is perceived as a
grave risk to the organization. One explanation is that health
care organizations benefit from some legislative protection
against the usual rules of discovery in most states-protection
believed to be necessary for "peer review" and "quality assurance"
programs.91 Health care organizations are not willing to risk their
86. See iiL (noting that Congress passed the Social Security Amendments of
1965 with a provision that hospitals accredited by the JCAHO are able to participate
in Medicare and Medicaid programs); see also WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH
CARE LAW AND ETHICS 1192-93 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that Medicare and Medicaid
certification are vital to an organization's financial health).
87. See, e.g., Belkin, supra note 21, at 28 (discussing the need for systemic
change to prevent patient injury in the context of several case studies of medical
error); Atul Gawande, When Doctors Make Mistakes, NEW YORKER, Feb. 1, 1999, at
40, 48-49 (relating instances of doctor error and describing a weekly intrabospital
conference held to address and correct them); J.M. Sharfstein, Asleep on the Job,
NEW REPUBLIC, June 21, 1999, at 17, 17-18 (recommending a reduction in resident
work hours to reduce patient injury); see also, e.g., Sandeep Jauhar, Z..f.D., First, Do
No Harm: When Patients Suffer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1999, at F8 (cataloguing
incidences of inefficient or dangerous health care and suggesting that less aggressive
treatment methods are safer).
88. See JCAHO, Sentinel Events Policy and Procedures (last modified June 15,
1999) <http://wwwb.jcaho.org/sentineVse_pp.html> (explaining that uneA-pected
instances of patient injury are called "sentinel" because "they signal the need for
immediate investigation and response").
89. See iiL
90. For instance, the American Hospital Association and the American
Society for Healthcare Risk Management opposed the policy. See American
Society for Healthcare Risk Management, Position Statement and
Recommendations: JCAHO Sentinel Event Reporting Program (visited Jan. 20,
2000) <http://www.ashrm.org/newsljcaho/blast3co.html> [hereinafter ASHRM,
Position Statement] (stating that the ASHRM believes that the JCAHO policy places
complying organizations at risk of financial and reputational damage).
9L See, e.g., Scripps Mem'l Hasp. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725, 725
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legislative privileges in order to comply with a JCAHO request
ostensibly aimed at preventing patient injury.92 The linkage
between the rules for accreditation and legal discovery assumes
that the adjudication of malpractice claims should predominate
over other institutional perspectives.
The patient safety perspective would start with an analysis
that sees the JCAHO as "law related" but primarily aligned with
political or administrative institutions rather than with courts
and the process of adjudication. Analyzing the JCAHO's recent
actions as part of political institutional analysis, the change in
policy is explained as an attempt to ward off regulatory or
legislative responses to "medical error." By offering to use its
influence to get more safety-related information, the JCAHO
hopes to maintain its own position as mediator between health
care organizations and political and administrative units of the
state. Or, to put the matter in terms of public choice theory, the
goal of the JCAHO is to maintain the political status of the
accreditation function it now exercises.93
In less cynical terms, the JCAHO's modification of its
standards dealing with sentinel events is a signal that political
institutions may be seeking a new equilibrium with health care.
The legislative privileges obtained during previous periods of
"malpractice crisis"94 are no longer considered sacred.
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that to allow the subpoena of hospital peer review
records for the purpose of impeaching an expert witness in a criminal trial would
subvert the legislature's intent to provide a broad privilege against such discovery).
92. See, e.g., ASHRM, Position Statement, supra note 90.
93. There also exists a wide variety of theories about how to analyze the
political process in law. For a description of those theories, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PuBLIC POLICY 43-66 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the
mechanics of several theories of the legislative process: proceduralist (how a bill
becomes a law), interest group (the influence of political groups), and institutional
(broad governmental structures)).
94. Nearly every state has some type of statute protecting records from
internal hospital review proceedings of patient injuries from discovery or admission
into evidence. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-445, 36-445.01 (West 1993);
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West 1995); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527 (McKinney 1985)
(relating a law prohibiting the disclosure of medical review records); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 161.032 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (making medical committee
records confidential and not subject to subpoena); see also Scripps Mem'l Hosp., 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726-27 (discussing California's enactment of legislative privileges
against discovery in 1968 and significant amendments made in the mid-1980s that
limited the privileges' scope). Congress sought to encourage these professional
review activities through the enactment of the Health Quality Improvement Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-660, tit. IV, § 401, 101 Stat. 3784 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1101(5))
(proclaiming that "[t]here is an overriding national need to provide incentive and
protection for physicians engaging in effective professional review"). The
effectiveness of this federal and state legislation in promoting "quality assurance" in

1999]PAT1ENT SAFETY, RISK REDUCTION, & THE LAW 1631
Furthermore, judicial attitudes toward privileges may be
changing because the costs of litigation over the scope of these
privileges are viewed as excessive as arbitration and other means
for settling disputes are developed. ~ More important, the
JCAHO's new policy might become an incentive for health care
organizations to free themselves from the medical liability
paradigm.
Consider again the Martin Memorial Hospital case.00 In that
instance, the hospital gave the plaintiffs and their lawyers what
was in effect a root cause analysis as described in JCAHO
policy.97 The hospital's purpose in waiving its legal right to keep
the document confidential, and offering an apology for the
accident, was to induce the plaintiffs to settle the case.98 There
was, of course, some risk that the plaintiffs would not agree on a
settlement figure, but obviously the organization was willing to
take that risk to achieve its organizational goal of quickly
restoring public confidence in the safety of the hospital.ro If an
organization is willing to deal candidly with the injured patient
in terms of future injury prevention, there is no legal risk to
providing the accreditation organization with its root cause
analysis. Apparently, the hospital and its insurer were more
interested in reducing the amount of overall economic loss than
in "winning" the lawsuit under the rules of adjudication. 1'""
Additionally, there is no empirical evidence to support the
claim that the privileges obtained through legislative lobbying
have in fact made hospitals safer for patients. The reason for this
9

health care has been criticized by one of Lucian Leape's co-investigators in the
Harvard Medical Practice Study. See Troyen A Brennan, Hospital Peer Reuiew and
Clinical Priuileges Actions: To Report or Not to Report, 28 JAMA 381, 381 (1999).
95. See, e.g., Goodwich v. Nolan, 680 A2d 1040, 1042-43 {Md. 1996J
(considering the privilege issue in the conteA-t of the arbitration of a medical
malpractice claim).
96. Refer to notes 21-35 supra and accompanying teA-t.
97. See Haas, supra note 21, at 2-6 (documenting the hospital's efforts at
finding the "root cause").
98. See id. at 6 (observing that the risk manager's candor in disclosing the
hospital error "stunned" the victim's family and that a settlement was reached
shortly thereafter); see also Jonathan R. Cohen, Aduising a Client to Apologize, 72 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1009, 1011-12 nn.7-8 (1999) (citing the effects of a lack of an apology on
the propensity of patients to sue for malpractice).
99. Refer to notes 30-35 supra and accompanying te.'\.1; (describing the positive
effects of public acknowledgement of the hospital's error).
100. One of the implications of the approach suggested in this Article is that the
entire process of settling cases of alleged malpractice should be studied from a
"systems thinking" perspective. The prominent role of the risk manager in the
Martin Memorial Hospital case points out the need to study the interaction of
lawyers, risk managers, and insurance representatives in settling cases from a
patient safety perspective. Refer to notes 25-28 supra and accompanying te.'\.t.
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assertion is that the "privilege," when asserted on behalf of a
corporate entity such as a hospital, does not in fact protect
organizational knowledge about the nature of errors within that
particular facility. 101 Rather, the privilege protects the knowledge
that is skewed by the process of litigation, which possesses its
own particular notion of "cause" and rules for presenting
evidence to the jury. Although this external perspective on the
cause of injury is an important constraint on health care
professionals, consider the possibility that the organization as an
organization knows very little about what causes injuries.
Most important, as pointed out by the Harvard Medical
Practice Study, the amount of litigation over adverse patient
outcomes is clearly not a complete picture of the amount of
"malpractice," not to mention the number of near misses so often
praised as the advantage of the aviation reporting systems. 102 But
the Harvard study's findings have larger theoretical implications
in terms of comparative institutional analysis.
The litigation process is always based upon a skewed
distribution of true rates of injury because there are barriers to
entry into the adjudication process,103 which like all institutional
processes, is imperfect in its attempts at achieving safety. Thus,
the real problem is which admittedly "imperfect institution"
should be allowed to balance the costs and benefits of safety. 104
Choosing the least detrimental institution requires some
empirical evidence and a willingness to set forth the value
premises driving the institutional choice.105 Because we already
have some evidence that adjudication does not appropriately
accommodate the number of "negligent" injuries that occur/ 00
10L See, e.g., TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 161.032 (West 1992 & Supp.
1999) (specifically exempting from the privilege records made in the regular course
of business); see also, e.g., Bush v. Dolan, 540 N.Y.S.2d 21, 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
(concluding that the privilege only applies to information obtained in the course of
the hospital's review proceedings); Barnes v. Whittington, 751 S.W.2d 493, 495-96
(Tex. 1988) (holding that the privilege for hospital committee records extends only to
documents generated by the committee in its investigation process).
102. See Localio et al., supra note 8, at 245 (concluding that litigation rarely
identifies substandard health care providers or compensates victinls). Refer to notes
48-50 supra and accompanying text (stressing the importance of reporting "near
misses," as the airline industry has done, in improving patient safety); see also
generally To Err Is Human, supra note 16.
103. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1-3 (listing the numerous rules dealing with a
commencement of action, pleadings and motions, parties, and depositions and
discovery, all of which carry substantial burdens).
104. See KOMESAR, supra note 18, at 156.
105. See, e.g., id. at 171-77 (using an economic analysis to evaluate institutional
responses to product liability based upon the economic and social characteristics of
those responses).
106. See Localio et al., supra note 8, at 245 (finding that litigation "infrequently"
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why should adjudication over medical injuries provide the model
for prevention of injuries?
Furthermore, adjudication is, when viewed objectively,
concerned with the post-injury state of the world. Prevention, on the
other hand, seeks to affect the pre-injury world. Legal scholars
arguably have little knowledge about the pre-injury world in health
care organizations because the debate over the liability or
adjudicatory process has so dominated our thinking. From the
perspective of generating new knowledge, the handling of potential
litigation (which is often years away) is analytically a distinct
function from safety improvement. If actors within the health care
organization are only concerned with adjudicative consequences,
not only are safety solutions often ignored, but the actors also lack a
framework for asking questions about systemic safety issues.
The generation of new knowledge begins with questions
about systems processes, not about who is responsible for injury.
Responsibility for injury is a socially defined process that may or
may not make a given procedure safer. The attractiveness of the
aviation-reporting model should not foster ignorance of the fact
that when passengers are injured or killed, there is an
independent liability system for compensating the victims or
their family members. 107 That is, those who administer the
reporting system for aviation do not have the authority to grant
immunity to anyone when there has been an injury, death, or
serious damage to an aircraft. 109 The investigation into the causes
of airline accidents by other government agencies can be used in
subsequent litigation and might encourage settlements rather
than prolong litigation.109 In some cases, such as the 1996 crash of
the ValuJet plane into the Florida Everglades, criminal charges
have been brought against certain corporate and individual
actors. 110
compensates medical malpractice victims).
107. See Charles E. Billings & William D. Reynard, Human Factors in Aircraft
Incidents: Results of a 7-Year Study, 55 AVIATION, SPACE & ENVTL. 1\f.ED. 960, 961
(1984) (noting that the potential liability associated with "every accident" may
complicate investigation).
108. But see id. (commenting that the FAA offers a "limited waiver of sanctions"
for the reporting of certain violations).
109. For example, after the Canadian investigation of the cause of a SwissAir
crash in September 1998 discovered some evidence of faulty wiring in the plane,
SwissAir and the manufacturer of the aircraft; agreed, in an unusual move, to accept
responsibility for the accident despite the fact that the exact cause of the accident
had not yet been determined. See Anthony Ramirez, SwissAir and Boeing to Split
Payment of Damages in Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1999, at B6 (reporting that
SwissAir and Boeing hoped that the action would speed claims settlement and
compensation to the victims' families).
110. See Rick Bragg, Politics Hinted in ValuJet·Crash Charges, N.Y. TIMES,

1634

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[36:1609

From the perspective of safety, it is not clear whether any of
the reforms that health care professionals hail as necessary, such
as damages limitations or the heavy reliance on custom evidence
in malpractice actions, increases the market forces for safety. 111
Similarly, it is equally unclear whether the medical liability
system increases the amount of safety or provides incentives for
actions of prevention in the pre-injury world of health care
delivery. 112 The issue is whether some institution-for instance, a
legislature-is convinced that some new institution-such as a
regulatory agency-would increase the margin of patient safety
within an acceptable cost range. 113 The answer to that question is
not solely theoretical, but obtained by careful assessment of the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the institutional
alternatives, including allowing market forces to operate.
"Market forces" do not simply mean economic costs, but all
forces driving actors in the health care system. These forces
include the sense of professionalism of various actors and
prospective patient demands and preferences as well as costs. As
systems thinking about medical errors continues to be part of the
media's portrayal of health care, 114 the general public's image of
medicine could be changing. The public perception that a single
bad outcome, such as the wrong foot being amputated, means
that the responsible health care facility is "unsafe" drives the
action of managers. 115 At a public relations level, health care
organizations may have to demonstrate that they practice "safe
medicine." At a scholarly level, researchers from various
disciplines must join in a multidisciplinary effort to generate new
July 15, 1999, at A12 (stating that third-degree murder and manslaughter charges
were being pursued against an aircraft maintenance company); see also Matthew L.
Wald, Murder Charges Filed by Florida in ValuJet Crash, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
1999, at A1 (reporting on the company's shocked response to the "criminaliz[ation] of
a series of mistakes"); When a Crash Can Be a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1999, at
A22 (editorializing against a widespread use of indictments against air industry
personnel in plane crashes, absent criminal negligence).
11L See KOMESAR, supra note 18, at 182-85 (arguing that where prevention is
obtainable, reforms that limit damages will too severely limit recovery and reduce
the impetus towards preventative measures).
112. See WEILER, supra note 43, at 70-73 (finding that plausible arguments can
be made on both sides of the medical liability debate).
113. See id. at 24-32 (recounting the various considerations of legislatures in
response to the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s).
114. See, e.g., Belkin, supra note 21, at 28 (calling for a change in hospital error
analysis from a personal liability model to a systems model).
115. After a highly publicized case in which surgeons removed the wrong foot of
a diabetic patient in Florida, hospital executives announced sweeping changes in
their procedures. See Doug Stanley, UGH Reduces Number of Surgeries, TAMPA
TRIB., Apr. 7, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Major Newspapers File
(stating that the hospital would reduce its volume of surgeries by one-fourth).
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knowledge about patient safety so that policymakers, both public
and private, can create the appropriate institutional
arrangements to promote patient safety. That research must
proceed during a period of uncertainty about the legal framework
of health care.
IV. PuBLIC HEALTH, MEDICAL LIABILITY, AND PATIENT SAFETY

The move from the liability model to the public health model
creates a great deal of legal uncertainty. The liability model
focuses analytical resources on an institution with which lawyers
are quite comfortable, and which health care professionals fearcourts.116 In the past, this perspective has meant that legislative
reform should correct for the misdeeds of the adjudicatory
process through damage limitations,117 arbitration panels, 118 or
some form of no fault. 119 Research under this model operates
beneath the metaphorical banner of a "blame-free system" that
would enhance safety.120
A public health model for patient safety begins with the
assumption that developing scientific knowledge about the nature
of medical errors is the most effective way to change the behavior of
actors. As a result, the coercive instruments of law are to be used
only as a last resort, and therefore public health pursues a more
diffuse and pragmatic strategy to achieve the goal of enhancing
patient safety.121 Sometimes, education-a market strategy-might
be employed. At other times, seeking the creation of a new
legislative authority to deal with patient safety might be chosen.122
116. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 43, at 6 {describing the lack of familiarity that
doctors have with courtrooms and their fear of juries' tendencies to sympathize with
injured patients).
117. See id. at 31 (detailing the motives of legislatures in limiting damages nnd
the means by which they have limited damage awards).
118. See id. at 102 (explaining that more than 12 states have authorized
pretreatment agreements "in which the patient agrees to accept binding arbitration
in lieu of a jury trial").
119. See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States Afford a 'Wo
Fault" System of Compensation for Medical Injury?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1997, at 1, 1-2 (introducing a comparison of patient compensation costs under
a liability model and a no-fault model).
120. See, e.g., Edward A. Dauer & Leonard J. Marcus, Adapting Mediation to

Link Resolution of Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health Care Quality
Improvement, LAW & CONTElllP. PROBS., Winter 1997, at 185, 185-86 (hypothesizing,
based upon empirical data, that iatrogenically injured claimants want to ensure that
errors are not repeated and that mediation can produce quality improvements).
121. Refer to text accompanying notes 78-81 supra (comparing the cooperative
means used by a public health model \vith the tort liability system's tactics of
coercion).
122. See, e.g., Gostin et al., supra note 73, at 75 (describing the government's
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The compensation of injured patients through the medical liability
system might occur, but eliminating the threat of liability or
imposing liability has never been high on the public health agenda.
Focusing on the community's health and community resources for
health improvement helps to diminish the search for an individual
to "blame" for a particular disaster or tragedy.
Given that new knowledge is not yet available, the public
rhetoric of systems thinking must confront the reality that
existing instruments of law (such as liability suits for
compensation, disciplinary procedures, and even criminal
prosecutions) are sometimes employed when there is in fact a
well-publicized instance of error that has led to injury.
Confronting the legal risks of liability for health care
organizations and professionals as well as disciplinary actions
and criminal prosecutions against professionals is necessary
because the kind of research that needs to be done requires the
cooperation of health care professionals. Achieving this
cooperation will require lawyers to increase their understanding
of the complexity and diversity of health care organizations.
A

Systems Thinking in Organizations and in Law

With their various notions about the interrelationship of
injury prevention and liability, tort reformers have proposed
normative models of how the "system of law" and the health care
system should relate. "Enterprise liability," initially applied to
hospitals 123 and later to health plans and managed care
organizations, 124 is one model widely discussed in the legal
literature that might be offered as law's response to systems
thinking about injury prevention within health care
organizations. 125 These reforms are based upon certain
assumptions as well as some empirical evidence about how the
incentives of enterprise liability operate within health care
organizations.

use of education, the marketing of alternative behaviors, and legislative measures
taken to discourage activities that are public health threats).
123. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 67, at 384-94 (chronicling the rise of
hospital liability for medical injuries).
124. See id. at 393 n.45 (noting that HMOs are subject to vicarious liability for
the negligent acts of their employee-doctors).
125. See id. at 401-04 (stating the reasons for the adoption of an enterprise
medical liability model, which include protection against dramatic medical
malpractice and insurance rate changes, an increase in the size of risk pools leading
to more predictable claims for hospitals, and a greater guarantee to victims of actual
payment on a judgment).
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The systems thinking that Lucian Leape and others promote
has been best described in the legal literature not by any tort
theorist, but by a bankruptcy lawyer, Lynn LoPucki. As he noted
in a recent publication, systems analysis is a "methodology
developed in the fields of engineering, business information
systems, and computer programming specifically to manage
complexity."126 LoPucki has emphasized that the major
contribution of systems analysis as applied to law is the "shift in
perspective from law as a conceptual system to law as an element
of concrete, empirically-verifiable 'law-related' systems."127
It is tempting to simply adopt the LoPucki model of a
systems approach to law, with its emphasis on empirically
verifiable elements. But to do so would ignore the fact that a
systems approach to error in health care is itself a search for
data, or as I prefer to call it, "knowledge." The premise
underlying the new emphasis on patient safety is that the extent
of the patient error problem in medicine is unknown because the
culture of medicine assumes that errors are simply a function of
poor performance by individual professionals. 126 In plain terms,
there is no data on error because, heretofore, only injuries,
mortality, and perhaps lawsuits were relevant from the
perspective of gaining knowledge about poor professional
performance. The kind of systems thinking that Leape and his
colleagues call for comes from engineering as well as numerous
other disciplines, such as "human factors" research and
organizational development. 129 It is the latter disciplines, which
do not necessarily have the patina that LoPucki refers to as
"scientific," that are of particular relevance to the patient safety
debate. 130
126. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 479,
481 (1997).
127. Id. at 482, 488-91 (endorsing the benefits of confining the study of law to
concrete systems, or systems composed of "real people and/or other physical objects,"
which include objectivity and the ability to infer functioning of the system when
direct investigation is not feasible).
128. See Belkin, supra note 21, at 28 (describing medicine as continuing to focus
on who made the error although other disciplines try to determine why an error
occurred); Leape, Error in Medicine, supra note 13, at 1852 (describing the medical
culture as manipulating blame and the punishment of individualB in order to
discourage error).
129. See, e.g., Lucian L. Leape, A Systems Analysis of Approaches to Medical
Error, 3 J. EvAL. CLIN. PRACT. 213, 213 (1997); Billings & Reynard, supra note 107,
at 960 (studying aircraft incident data to better understand the phenomenon of
human error, which contributes to at least half of all aviation mishaps).
130. LoPucki is probably a positivist. He concludes his article:
The systems approach provides a way for legal scholars to get in touch with
reality, to discover how law-related systems work through empiricism, and
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For patient safety advocates, systems thinking requires an
exploration of how individuals interact not only with technology,
but also with other human beings. For instance, organizational
theorists have developed the concept of ''high reliability
organizations"131 in determining how organizations reduce risk.
An oft-cited example is that of Navy aircraft carriersorganizations that manage numerous takeoffs and landings with
few accidents leading to injury, death, or loss of property. 132 The
low accident rate is impressive when one considers the speed at
which jet planes are moving when they touch the small surface of
the deck, and that those most responsible for "hooking" the
planes are young seamen. 133 These organizational theorists
emphasize the notions of "team work" and shared responsibility
for "safety" on aircraft carriers, and among flight crews in
general, that are antithetical to the hierarchical stereotype of the
chain of command in military organizations. 134 Despite a rigid
bureaucratic structure, the military in fact operates on a
different set of rules when it comes to "safety," not only with
regard to the pilots and crew working on the deck, but also to
protecting the millions of dollars invested in each military
aircraft and the aircraft carrier itself. 135
Advocates for patient safety have offered solutions from the
airline industry without noting how different health care is from
the airline industry in terms of both organization and
surrounding legal structure. Without demeaning the impressive
ways in which many industries have reduced risk, I suggest that
we need a way of thinking about individuals within systems
before we undertake the empirical search for error data.
It is important to outline, rather than to resolve, the
contours of the debate about the meaning of systems thinking.
First, systems thinking for the health care industry is greatly
to discover how they can be improved through modeling. The method is
analogous to the kind of systems analysis used to manage complexity in the
creation of business information systems and other comple..x computer
programs.
LoPucki, supra note 126, at 521.
131. See, e.g., Martha Grabowski & Karlene Roberts, Risk Mitigation in Large·
Scale Systems: Lessons from High Reliability Organizations, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV.
152, 152-53 (1997) (studying the characteristics of high-reliability organizations and
finding that their characteristics include "simultaneous autonomy and
interdependence, intended and unintended consequences, long [problem] incubation
periods ... and risk mitigation").
132. See Karl E. Weick & Karlene H. Roberts, Collective Mind in Organizations:
Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 357, 357-58 (1993).
133. See id. at 357-63.
134. See id. at 364.
135. See id. at 371-72.
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informed by the aviation narrative of safety, but ignores, at least
in its public rhetoric, the gradual reorganization of health care's
method of delivery and financial structures over the past twenty
years. 136 This reorganization-call it "managed care"-has
occurred, by and large, without governmental mandate or direct
intervention.137 Although there is a growing body of legal
at
changing
this
market-driven
scholarship
aimed
reorganization/38 there is also a large body of literature about
systems thinking that is applied to organizations. 133 For the
patient safety debate, the question becomes: are there social and
economic forces that might lead health care organizations to
embrace "patient safety"?
The systems thinking that deals with organizational
development in businesses is in fact grounded in general social
theory. 140 One social fact about health care organizations is that a
great many of the actors are licensed professionals-nurses,
respiratory therapists, pharmacists, social workers, physicians,
et cetera.141 Each of these professional groups has its own
licensure board and method of disciplining professionals. 142
Although physicians are assumed to be at the apex of the social
system, systems thinking about the issues of patient safety would
make us question whether physician behavior is the key variable
in making the organization a "safer" environment, just as the
Navy discards its traditional hierarchies on aircraft carriers. 143

136. See Liang, supra note 19, at 4.
137. See id. at 2-3.
138. See, e.g., id. at 92-93 (proposing a shift in incentive structures from n focus
on cost limits to one on patient care).
139. See, e.g., RoBERT L. FLOOD & NORMA R.A ROl\IM, DIVERSITY
MANAGEMENT: TRIPLE LoOP LEARNING xi-xii (1996) (describing the focus of their
study on diversity management, or the management of various models and
methodologies, and "triple loop learning," a deeper and more reflexive learning
process); PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFI'H DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE
LEARNING ORGANIZATION 1-7 (1990) (introducing the concept of "learning
organizations," which incorporate a systems thinking approach, to management and
business).
140. See FLOOD & ROMM, supra note 139, at 36-52 (stating that systems
thinking, based upon metatheory, has incorporated societal theory into its goal of
unifying science).
14L See CURRAN ET AL., supra note 86, at 927-31 (discussing various aspects of
medical professionals' licensure and their impact on the availability of providers,
benefits to consumers, and the effectiveness of licensing board disciplinary actions).
142. See id. at 930 (describing the history of disciplinary boards and recent
changes that have effected improvements in the collection of data on disciplinary
actions).
143. See SENGE, supra note 139, at 27-54 (providing examples from a systems
perspective in which problem solving focuses beyond individual mistakes to the
underlying structures that shape events).
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This wider view of the actors makes us aware of the social
construction of knowledge within health care organizationsfollowing "doctors' orders"-that may in fact create risks to patient
well being in some situations. When, for instance, a physician
makes a mistake in the decimal point of the dosage of a drug, the
failure of the nurse or pharmacist to question the dosage can lead
to tragic consequences.144 We know that some entity or person in
the health care system is legally liable after the fact for the injury
or death, but from a social theory perspective, the patient is the
client of the physician as well as the pharmacist, various nurses,
and the hospital. 145 The underlying premise of systems thinking,
when applied to social organizations, is that "[w]hen placed in the
same system, people, however different, tend to produce similar
results. "146 The "system" in this sense is not simply the
organizational structure, but the interrelationships of individuals,
the technology employed in the organization, and the various
organizational goals such as patient care, cost effectiveness, and
being a "good employer."147
The most important difference between the organizational
structures of health care and aviation, as systems, is that the
former is significantly more "diverse" than the latter in terms of
goals. "Diverse" in this context means that there is more tension
among the goals of various actors within the system of health
care than in aviation. 148 For instance, nurses, who are employees
of the hospital, might define their role as "caring" for the patient,
whereas surgeons, who are independent contractors, might
define their role as "curing" or "ameliorating" the patient's
disease. The hospital administrator must manage this type of
diversity in establishing staffing levels consistent with the
amount of expected reimbursement from private and
governmental insurance programs. 149
144. Refer to Part IV.C.1 infra (discussing accidental deaths resulting from the
misreading of a chemotherapy dose).
145. See, e.g., Settlement Reached in Overdose Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,
1995, at A20 [hereinafter Settlement Reached] (noting that the error leading to a
patient's chemotherapy overdose was overlooked by "[a]t least a dozen doctors,
nurses, and pharmacists").
146. SENGE, supra note 139, at 42-43 (advocating a perspective that looks
beyond individual mistakes to the system that shaped the erroneous actions).
147. See Leape, Error in Medicine, supra note 13, at 1851 (labeling the nature of
medical practice as "complex" and involving a "multitude of interventions that each
patient receives" with an unsurprisingly high error rate); SENGE, supra note 139, at
44 (explaining "systemic structure" as a term that is concerned with the
interrelationships between people and among key variables that influence behavior
overtime).
148. See Leape, Error in Medicine, supra note 13, at 1855.
149. Cf. FLOOD & ROMM, supra note 139, at 11 (defining "systemic" in terms of
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Although the military officers overseeing the departure and
landing of aircraft on an aircraft carrier have to manage
diversity, the military has the advantage that everyone on the
carrier is "in the Navy." As a result, everyone is a government
employee ultimately subject to the coercion of government
sanctions. The loss of an aircraft can, for instance, mean that the
officer in charge of the carrier is reassigned to a desk job even if
someone else lower in the chain of command was "responsible" or
"to blame" for the loss of the aircraft. At the same time, the
individual "responsible" is sanctioned, but in a public
organization such as the military, it is arguably difficult to hide
errors or accidents unless there is a "cover up." In effect, within
public systems, in contrast to essentially private systems such as
health care, the problem of diversity is more "manageable"
because the conflicts among social goals are less intense.1m
Two other points about organizational systems thinking as
applied to health care must be noted. First, some aspects of
systems thinking are grounded in what one writer has called
"cybemetics"-a belief that society is organized around scientific
and technological knowledge. 151 Such a belief, when applied to
health care, would posit solutions in technocratic terms such as
moving to computerized systems for writing and dispensing drug
prescriptions within hospitals.lli2 Given that modem medicine is
being able to manage this type of diversity). For an example of a court trying to sort
out the systems issues involved when a patient's insurance expires, see Muse u.
Charter Hospital, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 589, 596 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd per curiam,
464 S.E.2d 44 (1996) (stating that the hospital could be held liable for a physician's
discharge of a patient who later committed suicide because its policy of discharging
patients when their insurance expired interfered with the physician's professional
judgment).
150. The veterans' health system is government owned, but the professionals in
the system view themselves primarily as autonomous and quite often, at the
hospital level, they mirror those actors in a private system. From a legal perspective,
the rules of liability are different from those in the private sector. All health care
personnel working for the Department of Veteran's Affairs are immune from suits
regarding alleged malpractice committed in the exercise of their duties to the VA
under the Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1994); 38 C.F.R § 14.605(a)
(1998). A patient with such a claim would have no recourse except to sue the United
States. See 39 C.F.R § 14.605(b). The Department of Justice may defend VA
employees in suits brought against them for such claims, see id. § 14.514(b), and the
VA may indemnify those employees for judgments against them, see id. § 14.514(c).
For an example of how one VA hospital has handled medical mistakes, see S.S.
Karman & G. Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty MaJ..es the Best Policy,
131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 963, 963-67 (1999).
15L See FLOOD & RoMM:, supra note 139, at 37.
152. See David W. Bates et al., Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry
and a Team Intervention on Prevention of Serious Medication Errors, 280 JAMA
1311, 1315 (1998) (commenting that a physician computer order system prevented
"more than half of the serious medical errors" when used at a large tertiary care
hospital).
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closely aligned with science, one should expect that the systems
approach to health care issues will place a heavy emphasis upon
"data" as objective depictions ofthe real world. 153
Second, this analytical/empirical view of systems thinking as
applied to social organizations has a close relationship to the
recent debates over the dominance of positivism in the social
sciences. 154 This debate has had its influence on legal theorists, as
challengers to the dominance of legal positivism have offered
other methods of interpreting law. 155 Given this wide-ranging
debate, a variety of approaches to law is possible. At the same
time, there are a variety of ways in which law interacts with the
health care system. Finding the appropriate point of leverage in
the legal structure requires an openness to the possibility that
law-at least the system of imposing liability after a medical
injury-may in fact have little effect upon safety in the health
care system.
B. The Blurry Line Between Public Health and Medical Liability

To illustrate how this paradigm shift affects our thinking,
consider two cases from the borderline among public health,
medical liability, and the delivery of health care services. First is
the problem of HIV-infected blood in the early days of the AIDS
epidemic. In Doe v. American National Red Cross/ 56 the court
held that the supplier of blood products had provided a
professional service and could be found liable to a person
transfused with blood that had not been screened for the HIV
virus in 1983. 157 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) did
not approve the antibody test for blood until March 1985. 158

153. See generally LARRY I. PALMER, ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: LAW,
MEDICINE AND SOCIETY IN AsSISTED LIFE AND DEATH (forthcoming).
154. See FLOOD & ROl\:IM, supra note 139, at 22-23 (outlining the debate between
those societal scientists who espouse a "positivist, value-free" methodology taken
from the natural sciences and those who believe that the societal sciences ought to
develop their own methodology that would acknowledge "the influences of values on
theoretical interpretation").
155. For an interesting critique of the dominance of "scientism" in legal
scholarship, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY
IMAGINATION AND PuBLIC LIFE 83-86 (1995) (rejecting fixed, scientific approaches to
lawmaking and praising the common law process for its congruence with an
Aristotelian norm of practical reasoning that accommodates changes in
circumstances and values over time).
156. 848 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D. W. Va. 1994).
157. See id. at 1229, 1234-35.
158. See Robert Pear, AIDS Blood Test to Be Available in 2 to 6 Weeks, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1985, at 23.
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Shortly thereafter, the entire industry started to use the test to
screen the blood supply. 159
Once there was an understanding of how HIV was
transmitted, it seemed logical that screening the blood supply
would be a source of prevention. From a patient safety
perspective, the use of blood screening devices is crucial to
prevent the spread of the HIV virus through medical treatment.
In hindsight, most of this makes sense, but it is apparent that
the threat of liability for negligence also played a role in the
speed with which the industry adopted screening for HIV. In Doe,
the Red Cross argued unsuccessfully that the standard of due
care should be whether it had followed industry practices in
screening blood prior to the FDA's 1985 edict. 1v) At the time of the
transfusion, blood banks were not screening blood for the HIV
virus. The court rejected this analysis and allowed the jury to
decide, under a common law standard of negligence, if the
industry's practice (and thus that of the Red Cross) was
"reasonable."161 By rejecting the Red Cross's request for summary
judgment, the court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed to trial. 1&2
It is tempting to read Doe as representing the need for public
health perspectives to prevent the spread of infectious diseases
and ignore the larger systemic issues of patient safety. How does
a society assure itself that the products and devices used in
health care delivery minimize the risk of further injury to
patients? Although these issues were eventually resolved by FDA
regulation,163 one must remember that FDA regulation is, like
any other institutional response, of limited effectiveness. FDA
approval of a device does not and should not eliminate the
possibility of "product liability" for the manufacturer of a heart

159. See id. (describing FDA plans to distribute the test to 2300 blood banks,
plasma centers, and laboratories).
160. See American Nat'l Red Cross, 848 F. Supp. at 1231, 1235.
16L See id. at 1233 (stating that the defendant would face liability if "its
practices fell below the standards promulgated and practiced by the blood-banking
industry, or that the industry standards were themselves unacceptably deficient
given the [available] reliable data and knowledge"). Cases of this type were often
settled because the facts were usually quite egregious. For instance, in Doe, the Red
Cross had known for several years prior to the filing of the lawsuit that the blood
transfused into the young child in 1983 was contaminated because the donor had
died of AIDS. See id. at 1230. By 1990, when the child was diagnosed with mv, the
hospital's transfusion service had destroyed the records indicating who had received
the contaminated blood that the Red Cross had shipped. See id.
162. See id. at 1235-36.
163. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475-77 U996) (discussing
the history and development from the early part of this century of the FDA's
mandate to approve drugs and, later, medical devices).
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pacemaker, for example. 164 What is important to learn from Doe is
that there is interplay among the growth of knowledge (recall
that the test for routine screening of blood for the HIV virus had
not yet been developed when the Doe patient was infected), the
possibility of liability for failing to operate in accordance with
that knowledge, and the development of regulatory schemes.
The second example of the interplay among potential
medical liability, public health, and health care delivery is
dramatically illustrated by Bradshaw v. Daniel. 165 In Bradshaw,
the court held that a physician may be held liable for failing to
warn a wife of her risk of having Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever
after her husband died from the disease. 166 The physician treated
the husband for Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, but allegedly
never communicated to the wife the findings of the autopsy that
her husband's death, which occurred four days after admission to
the hospital's emergency room, was caused by the disease. 167 The
court's refusal to grant the defendant-physician summary
judgmene68 is significant for two reasons. First, there was no
physician-patient relationship between the wife and her
husband's treating physician. 169 In point of fact, a week after her
husband's death, she was admitted and treated for Rocky
Mountain Spotted Fever at a different hospital by a different
physician. 170 She died shortly thereafter.171 There was in fact a
limited time window to communicate to anyone the exact cause of
the husband's death because the Centers for Disease Control did
not confirm the physician's initial diagnosis of Rocky Mountain
Spotted Fever until nearly two months after the man's death. 172
Second, under most circumstances, a physician is potentially
liable under several theories if he or she wrongfully discloses the
medical records of a patient. 173
164. See id. at 474, 507 (holding that FDA approval of a pacemaker did not preempt the plaintiff's common-law claims).
165. 854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993).
166. See id. at 872-73.
167. See id. at 866-67.
168. See id. at 873.
169. See id. at 867.
170. See id.
17L See id.
172. See id. (relating, however, that an autopsy was initially performed by the
hospital shortly after his death).
173. See, e.g., Warner v. Lerner, 705 A2d 1169, 1173 (Md. 1998) (fmding a
physician liable to a patient for the disclosure of his medical records without the
patient's or hospital's permission). Cf. Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A2d 792
(Me. 1976) (holding a physician liable for invasion of privacy for taking photographs
of a patient without permission).
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The court's finding of an affirmative duty to warn
identifiable third parties of the risk of Rocky Mountain Spotted
Fever is justified, however, if one considers the case as one about
the distribution of professional knowledge. Rocky Mountain
Spotted Fever is not contagious,174 but the plaintiff's experts
testified that the ticks that cause the disease "cluster."176 As a
result, anyone in close proximity to a person infected with the
disease is likely to have been exposed to the ticks at the same
time as the infected person. 176 As between a layperson and a
physician with access to knowledge about the etiology of the
disease in a public health sense, the court held that physicians
have a legal duty to warn persons they can identify as potentially
exposed.177 This goes beyond the medical model of attempting to
treat the disease with the appropriate drugs and imposes a duty
to know about the public health consequences of the causative
agents-the bite from the ticks. Put in plain terms, every camper
should know of the risk of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, but
the court's ruling implies that a reasonable physician has a duty
to know about the phenomenon of clustering and the risks t{)
others closely associated with the patient who sought treatment.
In effect, the court ruled that the delivery of health care could not
be separated from the larger context of scientific knowledge
about the origins and spread of disease, including the public
health implications of professional practice.

C. "Blaming" Nurses
Nurses, rather than physicians, have been subject to
discipline or criminal prosecution for medical errors in some
recent, highly publicized cases. A focus on nurses will help to
delineate the systemic issues because nurses are most often
"employees" of health care organizations.178 Many physicians and
surgeons are, conversely, "independent contractors" working
within health care organizations, be they hospitals or networks of
managed care organizations. 179 Both incidents discussed in this
section involve the (mis)administration of drugs, the most
common source of medical error. 180
174. See Bradshaw, 854 S.W.2d at 869.
175. See id. at 867,872.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 872-73 (emphasizing a duty to warn "identifiable third persons in
the patient's immediate family against foreseeable risks emanating from a patient's
illness").
178. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 67, at 387.
179. See id.
180. Less well documented is the effect of "culture" on work in health care
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1. The Wrong Dosage of Chemotherapy. In 1994, Betsy
Lehman, a 39-year-old health care columnist for the Boston
Globe, and Maureen Bateman, a 53-year-old school teacher, were
patients at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in Boston. 191 Both
women had breast cancer. 182 An oncology resident ordered that
both women be given the same form of chemotherapy that was
approved for use at Dana-Farber under a special research grant
from the National Institutes of Health. 183 The protocol for this
treatment required that each patient receive the intravenous
drip over a four-day period. 184 Instead, the entire amount of the
drug was given to each woman during each twenty-four hour
period for four days. 185 Betsy Lehman died shortly after the
treatment overdose. 186 Maureen Bateman suffered cardiac
damage and died three years later. 187 Several months after Betsy
Lehman's death in March 1995, a clerk at Dana-Farber
discovered that Ms. Lehman had been given an overdose. 188
Defining the "error" that led to injury and death during the
course of an experimental treatment depends upon the
perspective taken. From a systems thinking perspective, the
injuries and deaths were caused by the process with which drug
organizations. See, e.g., David M. Gaba, M.D., Physician Work Hours: The "Sore
Thumb" of Organizational Safety in Tertiary Health Care, Presented at the
Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in Health Care Conference, Nov. 810, 1998, at 302 (proceedings on file \vith the author and the Houston Law Review).
18L See Lawrence K Altman, 2 Chemotherapy Overdoses Lead to Review of
Nurses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1999, at A14.
182. See id.
183. See Richard A. Knox, Dana-Farber Tests Signaled an Overdose, Records
Show, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe
File.
184. See Richard A. Knox & Daniel Golden, Drug Overdose Was Questioned:
Dana-Farber Pharmacist Sent Order Back to Doctor in Breast Cancer Case, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 19, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.
185. See Richard A. Knox, Doctor's Orders Killed Cancer Patient; Dana-Farber
Admits Drug Overdose Caused Death of Globe Columnist, Damage to Second
Woman, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 23, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Bglobe File.
186. See Altman, supra note 181, at A14.
187. See id.
188. See Robin Romano, Fatal Error Becomes Catalyst for Reform, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 15, 1999, at All. The chemotherapy overdose at Dana-Farber has
become a "case study" at the Harvard Business School. See Richard Bohmer & Ann
Winslow, The Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Harv. Bus. Sch. Case #9-699-025
(1999) (relating the history of Dana-Farber, its development and organization, and
the overdose and death of Betsy Lehman). The tutorial supplement to the case study
introduces "human factors" in health care. See Richard Bohmer, Complexity and
Error in Medicine, Harv. Bus. Sch. Case #9-699-024, at 4-8 (1998) (analyzing various
types of human error as they stem from either an "automatic" or "problem-solving"
mode of cognition). Human factors is one of the disciplines used by aviation experts
to enhance safety.

l999]PATIENT SAFETY, RISK REDUCTION, & THE LAW 1647

prescriptions are written, filled, and delivered to patients.183 Most
obvious in these cases was the fact that the handwritten
prescription for the drug used as chemotherapy for the two
patients' form of breast cancer was not clearly Iegible. 1w Another
possible source of the error is the ethos that nurses (and
pharmacists) do not question doctors' orders, especially on an
experimental treatment protocol that has no "routine
procedure."191
From a health care delivery perspective, Dana-Farber's
small hospital for inpatients did not have a cardiologist on the
scene that might have provided expert care when the two
patients suffered cardiac problems. A further organizational
issue was the fact that Dana-Farber was historically led by
biomedical researchers rather than health care professionals
emphasizing patient care.192 Finally, from the perspective of
medical liability, Dana-Farber was liable for both the injuries
and the deaths even if the physician who wrote the unclear order
might also be individually liable. 193
189. See Leape et al., The Nature of Aduerse Euents, supra note 6, at 383-84
(noting the role of the "medical-industrial system" in supplying drugs and
equipment); cf. Bohmer, supra note 188, at 7-8, 13-14 (revealing that adverse drug
events resulted from systems failures).
190. See Bohmer & Winslow, supra note 188, at 7. The physician who wrote the
prescription admitted in a consent proceeding with the Massachusetts physician
licensing board that he had been guilty of malpractice. See Bruce Mohl, Doctor
Penalized for Error in Dosage, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 1998, at B3, auailable in
LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File (discussing James M. Foran's consent agreement
with the Board of Registration and the Board's reasoning in asserting only mild
disciplinary action against him). The Board suspended his license for three years.
See id. (noting, however, that the license suspension was retroactive to a date three
years earlier, meaning Foran could immediately reapply for his license). At the time
the sanction was announced, he left the country for a research position at a London,
England hospital. See id.
191. Refer to notes 143-45 supra and accompanying teA-t. The nurse's ethical and
clinical dilemma in "innovative" treatment is powerfully portrayed in a fictionalized
account of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study in David Feldshuh's play focusing on an
African-American public health nurse. See generally MISS EVERS' BOYS (David
Feldshuh 1995). The play was later developed into a prizewinning made-fortelevision movie by Home Box Office and was a force in President Clinton's apology
to survivors for the United States Public Health-sponsored study. See Larry I.
Palmer, Paying for Suffering: The Problem of Human Experimentation, 56 MD. L.
REv. 604, 604-05 (1997).
192. See Bohmer & Winslow, supra note 188, at 3 (citing many of Dana-Farber's
medical breakthroughs to demonstrate that research has always been at the core of
Dana-Farber's mission); Richard A Knox, Dana-Farber Puts Focus on Mistakes in
Ouerdoses, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1995, at 1, auailable in LEXIS, News Library,
Bglobe File (commenting that Dana-Farber's investigators found that the institute
lacked patient-care expertise).
193. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 67, at 387-88 (relating that hospitals
are often found liable for their independent contractor physicians under a theory of
"apparent authority").
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Dana-Farber quickly offered settlements in both cases. 194
Relying upon the growing knowledge about systems errors,
Dana-Farber made changes in the way drugs were dispensed by
adopting the computer-order-entry system advocated by Lucian
Leape and his colleagues. 195 The organization went even further
and installed a new chief executive with patient care
experience. 196 The organization also transferred the operation of
its hospital to a Partners Hospital, a recent merger of several
hospitals affiliated with the Harvard Medical School. 197 In effect,
Dana-Farber recognized that it did not have the infrastructure to
run a "safe" inpatient hospital service and chose to focus on
outpatient care and research. 198 Of course, the JCAHO
investigated this highly publicized event, as did the
Massachusetts Department of Health. 199 Both agencies praised
the corrective efforts that Dana-Farber took to prevent future
occurrences.200
However, nearly five years after the event, the
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Nursing charged
eighteen nurses with failing to meet the standards of nursing
practice. 201 These charges of unprofessional conduct were based
upon the theory that one of the nurses hung the infusion bags for
the drugs and connected them to the patients, and the other
nurses, on subsequent shifts during the twenty-four hour period,
monitored the flow of the drugs. 202 The Board argued that the
nurses should have "verified" the dosage.203 The executive director
194. See Settlement Reached, supra note 145, at A20. In newspaper reports of
the settlement with Betsy Lehman's husband, a Dana-Farber employee, the
husband indicated that a portion of the settlement was donated to Dana-Farber for
research on finding a cure for cancer. See, e.g., id. The settlement with the other
patient, Maureen Bates, is described in a story of how she overcame the effects of the
overdose. See Richard A Knox, Survivor's Spirit Beats a Chemotherapy Error,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 1995, at 1, auailable in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.
195. See Robin Romano, supra note 188, at All. Refer to note 152 supra and
accompanying text (describing the advantages of a computerized drug dispensing
system).
196. See Richard Knox, Top Dana-Farber Doctor Steps Down, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 11, 1995, at 1, auailable in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.
197. See Richard A Knox, Three Hospitals Form Cancer Partnership; Dana·
Farber, Brigham, MGH Will Consolidate Treatment, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 1996,
at 1, auailable in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.
198. See id.
199. See Lucian L. Leape, Faulty Systems, Not Faulty People, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 12, 1999, at A15, auailable in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File [hereinafter
Leape, Faulty Systems].
200. See id.
20L See Altman, supra note 181, at A14.
202. Seeid.
203. See id.
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of the Board made it clear that the "system" she thought
appropriate was an individual professional system of "double
checking."204 Of the Dana-Farber practice, she said: "'Apparently
the system in place at the time did not require the nurses t<>
double check.'"205
The nurse-as-a-check on physician prescription error seeks
to elevate the status of nurses as the ultimate caretakers of
patients and protectors of patient safety. The statute granting
the Board of Registration authority to investigate complaints
against nurses, however, gives the Board the discretion to
develop its own standards of professionalism based upon
individual conduct.206 The real issue for the patient safety debate
is whether the Board would use its discretion to sanction a nurse
who failed to participate in the new computerized medication
system at Dana-Farber in instances in which no patient was
injured or killed. It is highly probable that disciplinary boards
are not yet ready to embrace "systems changes" as part of
individual professional responsibility. Therefore, those engaged
in systems changes after a tragic accident must take on the
burden of protecting individual professionals.Z(j7 This is what
Dana-Farber has in fact done by publicly defending the nurses.m
Yet two of the nurses quickly settled with the Board and agreed
to a year's probation and retraining.209

2. Giving the Right Drug in the Wrong Fashion. Miguel
Angel Sanchez died one day after he was born at a Colorado
hospital in October 1996.210 Three nurses who gave him a large
dosage of an oil-based penicillin intravenously rather than
intramuscularly were charged with criminally negligent
homicide.211 The nurses not only gave the baby the drug in an
improper fashion, they gave him more than ten times the amount
204. See Leslie Miller, Nurses Face Sanctions for Following Orders that Led to
Overdoses, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 6, 1999, at 9A (squarely blaming the tragedy on the
nurses' failure to question the dose).
205. Id.
206. See MAss. GEN. LAws .ANN. ch.112, §§ 74,80 (West 1996).
207. Cf. Leape, Faulty Systems, supra note 199, at Al5 (urging that the Board of
Registration in Nursing's bringing the 18 nurses involved in the Dana-Farber
overdose to disciplinary hearings was inappropriate).
208. See Altman, supra note 181, at Al4 (quoting Dana-Farber's president as
saying that the nurses "did their job" as they should have).
209. See Leslie Miller, supra note 204, at 9A (commenting that the other 16
nurses still faced disciplinary charges).
210. See Ann Schrader & Marilyn Robinson, Baby's Nurses Face Homicide
Charges, DENVER POST, Apr. 29, 1997, at A-01, available in 1997 WL 6071695
[hereinafter Schrader & Robinson, Baby's Nurses].
21L Seeid.
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of the penicillin that the doctor had intended and in fact
ordered.212 By calling a noted systems thinker on medication
errors as an expert witness, the defense presented enough
evidence about how the initial error made by the pharmacists in
misreading the prescription led to the tragic death to raise a
reasonable doubt about whether the nurses operated in a manner
that deviated "grossly from the standard of care."213 The two
nurses who went to trial were acquitted, and the third nurse
entered a plea of nolo contendre and did not receive a jail term or
fine.zt4
Not surprisingly, the grand jury indictment of the three
nurses created a great deal of alarm among health care
professionals involved in the patient safety movement. 21u Little
attention has been given to determining whether there are
means of providing some protection for nurses from criminal
prosecution, but not immunity, within existing doctrines
surrounding medicine. Once again, the fear of litigation (meaning
malpractice) has obscured the need for careful analysis of the
distinction between the way civil and criminal law operates,
particularly how criminal law ought to operate vis-a-vis health
care professionals. Even after looking at the facts in a light most
212. See id.; see also Michael R. Cohen, RPH. MS, FASHP, Error, Negligence,
Crime: The Denver Nurses Trial, presented at the Enhancing Patient Safety and
Reducing Errors in Health Care Conference 71 (Nov. 8-10, 1998) [hereinafter Cohen,
Error, Negligence, Crime] (proceedings on file with the author and the Houston Law
Review).
213. See id. "A person acts with criminal negligence when, through a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise, he fails
to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a
circumstance exists." COLO. REV. STAT.§ 18-1-501(3) (1999). "Any person who causes
the death of another person by conduct amounting to criminal negligence commits
criminally negligent homicide which is a class 5 felony." Id. § 18-3-105.
214. See Cohen, Error, Negligence, Crime, supra note 212, at 71. The nolo
contendre plea is in substance a plea of guilty. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROCESS 6 (1974). A great deal of the criminal process
is through nonadjudicative processes that often mask important questions of law,
ethics, and public policy. See Larry I. Palmer, Life, Death and Public Policy, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 161, 161 (1995) (reviewing NEIL K KOMESAR, ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) and presenting a
provocative representation of the problems of analyzing issues of law and medicine
in the context of a nolo contendre plea by a health care professional). Guilty pleas
and acquittals present lawyers with a particular problem of analysis because our
common law training is developed from adjudicated cases, particularly appellate
cases. See id.
215. William Sage of Columbia Law School stated that the accountability issues
involved in the Denver Nurses Trial encouraged the conference participants to
consider safety in their own systems. See Plenary Session: Responses from Multiple
Perspectives, Presented at the Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in
Health Care Conference 115 (Nov. 8-18, 1998) (Nancy W. Dickey, moderator)
(proceedings on file with the author and the Houston Law Review).
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favorable to the District Attorney who brought the charges, there
are grounds to argue that the indictments should have been
dismissed.
The Sanchez baby was "healthy."216 The problem was that
the mother's doctor was concerned about the effects of her history
of syphilis on the newborn.217 Although the mother tested positive
for syphilis, she indicated that she had been treated for syphilis
in Los Angeles.218 Unwilling to take the mother's word, someone
in the hospital checked with the Los Angeles Department of
Health about the mother's treatment.219 The Health Department
was unable to confirm the mother's treatment.=
It is, however, clear that the laboratory test conducted on
the date of the baby's death indicated the baby did not have
congenital syphilis.221 Without waiting for the results of these
tests, a neonatologist, who had taken over the care of the baby
from the family practitioner, wrote the prescription for a single
dosage of the penicillin.222 In hindsight, it is obvious that the
prescription was written on the "hunch" that the thirty-two-yearold mother of then four children had untreated syphilis.
It is also clear that the form of penicillin prescribed,
"Benzathine penicillin G," was not a standard form of penicillin
because it was described as a "non-formulary drug."223 The
pharmacist filling the prescription was unfamiliar with the drug
and with the treatment for congenital syphilis and consulted

216. See Schrader & Robinson, Baby's Nurses, supra note 210, at A-01.
217. See Keith Coffman, Lawyer: Nurse Was Not at Fault; Woman on Trial in
Baby's Death, DENVER POST, Jan. 29, 1998, at B-03, auailable in LEXIS, News
Library, Dpost File (noting that the mother had been infected with syphilis 15 years
before).
218. See Error, Negligence, Crime-The Denver Nurses Trial; Part One: The
Anatomy of an Event, Presented at the Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing
Errors in Health Care Conference 68 (Nov. 8-18, 1998) (Philip Schneider, moderatorJ
[hereinafter Schneider, Anatomy of an Euent] (proceedings on file with the author
and the Houston Law Reuiew ).
219. See id.
220. See id. at 67. There may have been some language barriers because it is
apparent from newspaper reports, but not the hospital's own description of the case,
that the father spoke only Spanish. See, e.g., :Michael Romano, Day·Old Boy Dies
After Injection; Hospital Acknowledges Error, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 24,
1996, at lA, auailable in 1996 WL 12352690.
221. See Schneider, Anatomy of an Euent, supra note 218, at 68 !listing {ice
diagnostic tests performed on the infant, all of which were negative for syphyllis).
222. See id.
223. See Error, Negligence, Crime-The Denver Nurses Trial; Part Two: Theory
and Remedy, Presented at the Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in
Health Care Conference 71 (Nov. 8-18, 1998) (John W. Senders, moderator)
(proceedings on file with the author and the Houston Law Reuiew ).
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several texts to determine the dosage. 224 In doing so, the
pharmacist misread the dosages described in both texts and
prepared a ten-fold increased dosage. 225 She placed the dosages in
two syringes and labeled the plastic bag containing the syringes
to indicate that the drug was to be given intramuscularly.226
The nurses assumed that each syringe could be used in an
intramuscular injection for only a limited amount of the
mistakenly written dosage. 227 They believed that giving the
amount in hand intramuscularly would require five injections,
and consulted a text in the neonatal nursery to determine if the
drug could be given intravenously, allegedly to prevent the pain
of giving multiple intramuscular injections to the infant. 228
Unfortunately, the text they consulted did not mention
Benzathine penicillin G, but did mention that another form of
penicillin could be given intravenously for the treatment of
congenital syphilis. 229 In giving the drug intravenously, the
nurses violated both the doctor's and the pharmacist's orders.230
Bearing in mind that the baby in fact did not have
congenital syphilis as well as the other demographics of the case,
one can imagine how an elected district attorney might easily see
this as a case of gross carelessness in overmedication. On the
other hand, in our adversary system, a lawyer for the nurses
should have tried to test the legitimacy of the prosecutor's
instincts by attempting to dismiss the indictment. Dismissing an
indictment is very difficult in American criminal jurisprudence
because prosecutors are given such wide discretion in charging
crimes. There is, however, some precedent in the medical area
developed for physicians that should be used for nurses.

3. The "End-of-Life" (Mis)Diagnosis. In Barber v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles,231 two doctors, who were charged with
murder for allegedly "pulling the plug'' too quickly on a patient in
a persistent vegetative state, filed a writ of prohibition. 232 There
224. See id.
225. See Schrader & Robinson, Baby's Nurses, supra note 210, at A-01.
226. See id.
227. See Schneider, Anatomy of an Event, supra note 218, at 68-69.
228. See Ann Schrader & Marilyn Robinson, Healthy Baby's Tragic Death at
Hospital Being Probed, DENVER POST, Oct. 25, 1996, at B-07, available in 1996 WL
12634805.
229. See Schneider, Anatomy of an Event, supra note 218, at 69.
230. See Schrader & Robinson, Baby's Nurses, supra note 210, at A-01 (revealing
that the pharmacist affixed a label to the prescription order which stated that it was
to be injected intramuscularly).
231. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
232. See id. at 486.

1999]PATIENT SAFETY, RISK REDUCTION, & THE LAW 1653

was some doubt as to whether the diagnosis of a persistent
vegetative state could have been made as quickly as the
physicians did prior to seeking permission from the patient's
family to terminate all life support.233 As a matter of fact, the
evidence at the preliminary hearing indicated that the family
members thought the patient was "brain dead" when they were
asked to sign a consent and a release of liability.zu There is a
legal distinction between being "brain dead"-which in nearly
every state constitutes a definition of death-and being in a
"persistent vegetative state" that may allow, but not require, the
removal of all life support including nutrition and fluids.
Nonetheless, the California court dismissed the indictment on a
broad jurisprudential ground about how the conduct of health
care professionals should be analyzed in the criminal law.=
The court ruled that the "act" of removing life support must
be viewed in the context of the "physician's duty" to a patient.z:m
Thus, to support a criminal charge at the indictment stage, the
prosecution must prove to a court (not a jury) that a physician
had a duty to continue treatment.237 In effect, the court's duty
analysis ironically views the physician's acts for the purposes of
criminal law as if they were "omissions"-a failure to do
something to prevent harm to the dead person.239 The rationale
for such a ruling is that the role of physician carries with it risks
to human life and health that must be accounted for before
criminal liability is considered.239 This explains why so few
prosecutions are in fact brought regarding "end-of-life care," why
grand juries often refuse to indict, and why juries in fact are
reluctant to convict physicians charged with crimes for their endof-life actions. 240 A prosecutor must overcome all the barriers in
our common law system against convicting individuals for
"omissions."
233. See id. at 486, 491.
234. See PALMER, LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 100
(recounting evidence from the magistrate's findings).
235. See Barber, 195 Cal Rptr. at 493 (concluding that there was no legal duty
to continue medical treatment and, therefore, no reason for the court to ascertain
whether the physicians' conduct was the proximate cause of death).
236. See id. at 490 (analyzing the physicians' conduct as an "omission rather
than [an] affirmative action").
237. See id.
238. See Glanville Williams, EuthalUlSia, 41 :MED. LEGAL J. 14, 21 (1973).
239. See Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89 (recognizing that this intersection of
advanced medical technology and limited legislative guidance requires the
evaluation of several social and philosophical issues).
240. See PALMER, ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS, supra note 153, at 8-9, 13-14
(discussing the technical arguments made before juries by Jack Kevorkian's lawyers
in his early trials for assisted suicide).
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4. Summary. The application of this principle to the nurses
in the Sanchez case requires the resolution of two issues. First,
whether the duty analysis announced in the California murder
case discussed above should apply to criminally negligent
homicide, the crime with which the nurses were charged. 241
Murder and criminally negligent homicide or manslaughter
represent two distinct theories about how human death is caused
and concomitant widely different ranges of punishments. 242
Without attempting to resolve an issue that criminal law
scholars have debated for years, it can be stated by asking
whether the court in Barber would have dismissed the
indictment if the prosecution had charged the physicians with
criminally negligent homicide, rather than murder, under the
California statutes. 243
The second issue is whether nurses are entitled to the
benefits of Barber. The argument against application of the
Barber duty analysis to nurses is the notion that nurses are
simply to follow doctors' (and pharmacists') orders and therefore
should not and do not engage directly in the risky life and death
actions of physicians. However, the argument for applying this
barrier from criminal prosecution to nurses stems, perhaps
ironically, from systems thinking about health care. Had the
nurses questioned the pharmacists, and even the neonatologist,
they might have prevented an "error." Had they gone further and
asked for a confirmation of the supposed underlying diagnosis of
congenital syphilis, they might have completely reversed the
course of the "treatment" plan.
But the point of raising the theory to dismiss the indictment
is not to prove that it would work, but to demonstrate the need
for an understanding of the complexity of the legal system as
health care organizations embark on efforts to reduce errors in
health care. As the new scientific discipline of patient safety
emerges, individuals will be subject to professional disciplinary
proceedings and criminal charges. 244 In practical terms, until the
new knowledge is created, health care organizations concerned

See Schneider, Anatomy of an Euent, supra note 218, at 69·70.
See MODEL PENAL CODE§§ 210.2, 210.4, available in WESTLAW (current
through the May 1998 meeting of the American Law Institute) (suggesting that
criminally negligent homicide is a third degree felony and murder is a ftrst degree
felony).
243. See PALMER, LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 105.
244. See Leape, Faulty Systems, supra note 199, at 1 (condemning the
disciplinary sanctions against the Dana-Farber nurses). Refer to note 110 supra and
accompanying text (relating the criminal charges that air industry personnel faced
after a crash).
241.
242.
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with systemic approaches to safety must understand and account
for the legal risks of proceeding.

D. The Risks of Research on Patient Safety
At present, the patient safety movement is a national
movement, but the criminal and civil liability systems remain
state based. The key actors in the movement, namely scholars,
the American Medical Association
CAMA), national
pharmaceutical associations, and federal regulatory agencies
such as the FDA, seek national solutions.24 fi In addition, some of
these leaders, such as the National Patient Safety Foundation at
the AMA, have spurred the development of state initiatives.:w>
There are legal risks both to individuals and organizations in
attempting to create new knowledge about patient safety. The
issue is not how to eliminate those risks, but how to minimize the
legal risks while focusing on the overall goal of reducing physical
risks to patients. More generally, there is legal instability
because of the social, economic, and demographic changes
affecting health care delivery in this country. To bring those
forces into focus, we must consider a state in which the forces of
managed care and liability reform over the past quarter of
century are evident.
California, a state that adopted some of the 1970s reforms of
the malpractice system and that is dominated by managed
care,247 has statutory provisions protecting certain kinds of
"studies" from legal discovery or from being admitted into
evidence at trial. The California Evidence Code, for instance,
prohibits the records of in-hospital studies aimed at reducing
"morbidity or mortality" from being admitted into evidence in a
civil proceeding, although they are subject to discovery.u5
Another provision of the Evidence Code protects the records of
"peer review" committees aimed at "improvement of the quality
of care" from discovery in a civil action. 249 Finally, a provision of
245. See, e.g., National Patient Safety Foundation, News Brief (visited Jan. 20,
2000) <http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/npsflnewsf06_14_99.htm> (noting, for
example, the NPSF collaboration \vith the FDA, medical and pharmaceutical
industries, and public interest groups to form cooperative improvements in
pharmaceutical safety).
246. For information about the various regional forums held since 1997 in
Washington, Minnesota, Louisiana, Texas, Massachusetts, and Florida see
<http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/npsflforums.htm> (visited Jan. 20, 2000).
247. See Elizabeth Rolph et al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths
and Reality, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1997, at 153, 167 (noting that
California adopted statutory medical malpractice tort reforms in 1975).
248. See CAL. EVID. CODE§ 1156 (West 1995).
249. See id. § 1157(a).
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the Health and Safety Code requires health plans to have
continuous review of "quality of care, performance of medical
personnel, utilization of services and facilities and costs."2G0 If
these quality assurance activities are performed by a "peer
review committee," these records are also protected from
discovery.
Within existing legislation there are some exemptions from
the usual rules favoring broad discovery in civil litigation for
health care organizations.251 These exemptions are justified on
the assumption that patient risk is reduced if the data is not
allowed to become part of the litigation or regulatory process. 2G2
Without verifying that assumption, these types of exemptions
provide the umbrella under which health care organizations can
undertake research on patient safety.253
But relying solely upon the professionals within health care
organizations themselves to create the new knowledge about
patient safety seems inappropriate for a number of reasons
unrelated to possible conflicts of interest. First and foremost, the
kind of knowledge necessary for patient safety-systems
knowledge about organizational processes-is not particularly
the province of clinicians. Second, perhaps out of their sense of
responsibility for their patients, clinicians overestimate legal
risks and should not be expected to make strategic decisions
about those legal risks. Third, lawyers who work within health
care organizations generally see risks only in terms of litigation
because of health care professionals' fear of malpractice
litigation. This is perhaps another way of saying that health care
clinicians and their lawyers are "conservative" and therefore
unlikely to see the context for change.
But in California and elsewhere, the seeds of change in the
legal environment are evident. California is one of the few states
that allows mandatory arbitration of malpractice claims as a way
of avoiding the excessive costs of litigation over medical injury.2M
Recently, however, the California Supreme Court, in Engalla v.
250. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 1999).
251. Refer to notes 248-50 supra and accompanying text (citing California
statutes that protect health care organizations from discovery in civil actions).
252. See Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Discovery of Hospital's Internal Records
or Communications as to Qualifications or Evaluations of Individual Physician, 81
AL.R.3d 944, 946 (1977) (establishing that many states adopted these statutes out
of fear that the committees would not function effectively if their proceedings wore
subject to discovery).
253. See id.
254. See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §§ 1281.2, 1290.2 (West 1982) (allowing a court
to compel arbitration pursuant to a contract between the patient and a health care
provider).
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Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 255 ruled that Permanente's
method of implementing arbitration was potentially
"fraudulent."256 One of the reasons for this finding was the
empirical evidence that arbitration took as long as litigation.257
Permanente settled the case and sought to "reform" its
arbitration process by providing some independent oversight of
the process.256 The invitation to outsiders to ensure the "quality"
of its arbitration process is a model for how health care
organizations must pursue research on patient safety.2.:;9 The
organizations must form partnerships with scholars to achieve
their goals. These partnerships between health care professionals
and researchers are more typical in the public health model than
in the liability model that dominates most of the tort reform
literature.260
California also has imposed a statutory limit on the amount
of nonpecuniary damages awardable in malpractice cases. Its
$250,000 limit on the recovery of nonpecuniary loss was
established in 1975 and has not been raised since.201 Lawyers
have an incentive to get around this limitation through a number
of devices, including filing products liability actions to which the
limitation does not apply. 262 If some of the proposed reforms, such
as imposing liability on managed care organizations, are
implemented in California, the incentive to sue the managed care
organization would grow because there would be no limit on the
amount of recovery for "wrongful denial" of treatment. In effect,
255. 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
256. See id. at 908 (concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's initial findings of Permanente's fraudulent conduct, but that questions
offact remained to decide if there was "actual" fraud).
257. See id. at 912 (observing that on average, it takes almost two and a half
years to actually reach an arbitration hearing with Kaiser).
258. See Mark A. Kadzielski et al., Managed Care Contracting: Pitfalls and
Promises, 20 WHI'ITIER L. REv. 385, 403 (explaining that Kaiser convened an
independent panel that recommended the creation of an advisory group to
implement an independent administrator arbitration system, the opportunity to
settle cases early through mediation, and the freedom for patients to choose a single
arbitrator to settle the dispute).
259. See David R. Olmos, Kaiser Agrees to Alter Process of Arbitration, L.A
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1998, at ill. See generaUy DAVYDD J. GREENWOOD & MORTEN LEviN,
INTRODUCTION TO ACTION RESEARCH: SOCIAL REsEARCH FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 4

(1998) (defining the concept of action research in part as cooperation between people
outside and inside the organization).
260. But see, e.g., Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 7, at 55 (promoting a no-fault
liability system for medical malpractice).
26L See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 1997) (effective Sept. 24,
1975).
262. Refer to note 34 supra (noting that in the Martin Memorial Hospital case,
the plaintiffs employed a medical products liability lawyer).

1658

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[36:1609

there are many threats to the "stable cost structure" surrounding
patient injury and safety in California and other states.

V.

CONCLUSION

Lawyers and regulators cannot mandate the new system
that is needed for error reduction in health care. The system for
error reduction must be created through the reiterative process
that has already created the public health system in this country
and throughout most of the world. At some point, law or the
regulatory process might put its imprimatur upon the system of
error reduction. What that legal structure should be-the
methods by which society holds organizations and individuals
accountable for the safety of the health care system-is open to
question. To create that system of accountability requires new
knowledge. Creating that system also requires abandoning the
liability model as the paradigm for ensuring safety or inhibiting
its enhancement. One of the most important roles for lawyers in
these multidisciplinary efforts is to begin asking questions about
the relationship of the legal environment to error reduction.
Examples of the kinds of questions lawyers might pose for
researchers from a variety of disciplines are as follows: Are the
"error rates" different in systems in which physicians' risk of
legal liability for malpractice has been assumed by a health care
organization? And, are the "error rates" different in fee-forservice settings as opposed to managed care settings?
The seminal study on errors in medicine and malpracticethe Harvard Medical Practice Study-was done in New York
State on hospital data collected in the 1980s when New York was
clearly in the "fee-for-service" mode of health care delivery. 263
Thus, the error rates in medicine quoted in the literature and by
the National Commission are likely based upon that study.
Further studies in states more in the "managed care" mode need
to be conducted.
California and Massachusetts are the two states with the
largest concentration of managed care enrollees in the country.264
In addition, some of the largest hospitals in Boston, most of them
associated with the Harvard Medical School, have moved to a
263. See Brennan et al., supra note 6, at 370 (presenting the methodology of the
Harvard study and highlighting the fact that more than 31,000 hospital records
were reviewed).
264. See Steven J. Balla, Markets, Governments, and HMO Development in the
1990s, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'¥ & L. 215, 215-16 (1999) (noting that "well over 35
percent" of the populations of California and Massachusetts were enrolled in
managed care).
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system of contractually assuming the liability of the physicians
practicing in their hospitals.265 The theory behind this notion of
"enterprise liability" is that the hospital is more careful in
selecting the doctors it allows to practice in its hospital and is
likely to monitor their work more closely if it pays for the
malpractice claims of its physicians.266 The reduction of errors
and injuries in anesthesiology, and the accompanying reduction
in malpractice claims since the 1980s,267 were the results of the
synergistic efforts in these hospitals.
The combination of law-and-economics thinking that has led
to both the dominance of managed care and "enterprise liability"
in some aspects of the Massachusetts health care delivery scene
suggests that researchers might find a different error rate from
that found in New York in the 1980s. This is not to suggest that
the error rate is higher or lower, but that researchers should be
careful to explore whether there is evidence that the legal
environment is a crucial factor in reducing error rates.
For slightly different reasons, a comparison between the
error rates for a similar type of high-risk health care procedure
in New York and California might provide some provocative
discussion of the role of law in enhancing or inhibiting patient
safety. There is also a significant difference in New York and
California "malpractice law"-California has a more "liberal"
standard for proving malpractice in court than does New York.z;;a
Yet California has one of the most restrictive limitations on the
amount of damages an injured person can recover for "pain and
suffering" in this country ($250,000),2m while New York has no
restriction. 270 The issue that I encourage researchers to focus on
265. See Paul C. Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The Place of Malpractice in Health Care
Reform, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1157, 1185 (1995).
266. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 67, at 393-94.
267. See Francis H. Miller, Medical Discipline in tlze Twenty-First Century: Are
Purchasers the Answer?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1997, nt 31, 44
(recounting how Harvard's shift to self-insurance prompted development of quality
standards for administering anesthesia, resulting in a remarkable decrease in error
rates and malpractice claims).
268. Compare Riley v. Wieman, 528 N.Y.S.2d 925, 928-29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)
(summarizing a two-tiered standard in medical malpractice cases that requires
doctors to conform "to accepted community standards of practice" and use their "best
judgment and whatever superior knowledge, skill and intelligence" they have), with
Barris v. Los Angeles, 972 P.2d 966, 971 n.1 (Cal. 1999) {restating the California
standard of care as requiring physicians to "exercise that degree of skill, lmowledge
and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under
similar circumstances").
269. Refer to note 261 supra and accompanying text (discussing the California
statute limiting noneconomic loss).
270. See, e.g., Tort Law in New York Today, N.Y. ST. B.J., Apr. 1999, at 8, 12
(explaining that "there are literally no limits on awards for such highly subjective
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is which aspect of law-the threat of adjudication of ''blame" or
"fault" in court, or the threat of loss of money through a
monetary award to a patient-has the greater impact on patient
safety. The search for new systems of accountability is, however,
also a search for appropriate methodologies for these
interdisciplinary efforts. We should not assume that empirical
methods of economics are the only methods to employ. There may
be more sophisticated mathematical models available, such as
those developed in systems engineering.271
Systems engineering is an alternative method of generating
empirical methods that will free us from some of the limitations
of the law-and-economics approach of tort reformers. The
mathematical models used in systems engineering were designed
to study complex organizations. 272 In contrast, economics started
with a bias towards individual behavior and contractual notions,
even when discussing notions such as the "firm."273 Systems
engineering will appeal to the positivist tendency of sciencetrained health care professionals and to legal scholars inclined
towards positivist theories oflaw.
At the same time, lawyers who join with health care
researchers working within health organizations may have to
learn some different qualitative methods. This Article suggests
exploring the applicability of "action research" with its explicit
critique of the positivist notion of social science.274 Action
research, on the other hand, is a way of studying organizations
and their problems that assumes that the outside researchers
and those within the organization share the same goal of
enhancing patient safety.275 Action research's commitment to
democratic research-allowing those in the organization to
injuries as emotional trauma, loss of companionship, and pain and suffering").
271. A method of modeling used in systems engineering that might be helpful in
analyzing data in large, complex health care organizations is called Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). See Jon A Chilingerian, Exploring Why Some
Physicians' Hospital Practices Are More Efficient: Taking DEA Inside the Hospital,
in DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS: THEORY, METHODOLOGY, AND APPLICATION 167,
168-69 (Abraham Charnes et al. eds., 1994) (reporting on a pilot study employing
data envelopment to measure physician efficiency).
272. See Boaz Golany & Yaakov Roll, Incorporating Standards Via DEA, in
DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 271, at 313-14.
273. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims:
Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective,
84 CORNELL L. REv. 1266, 1266 (1999) (addressing the "nexus of contracts"
paradigm of corporate law in contrast to the law-and-economics-influenced exclusive
shareholder beneficiary of fiduciary duty paradigm).
274. For a description of the field of action research, see generally GREENWOOD
& LEVIN, supra note 259, at 4.
275. See id.
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participate in the definition of problems and the design of
research-will help to deal with the problem of obtaining
cooperation from those who must undertake the risks of changethe health care professionals themselves.
The positivist tradition sees the professionals as the objects
of study, whereas the action researcher proposes to engage the
professionals as co-investigators in improving safety. The action
researcher does not claim a detached, positivist "indifference" or
"neutrality" on the issue of patient safety. Furthermore, the
action researcher is more open to the "politics" of change. In
other words, the messy process of public health law can be
invoked to promote change within organizations while generating
new knowledge for the public policy processes.
The following hypothesis is therefore proposed: the medical
liability system and other regulatory processes for health care
will lose their centrality as optimizers of patient safety when
health care providers develop systems of detecting, reporting,
and preventing medical errors that the general public views as
reliable. In collaborating with the public in a dialogue over
patient safety, lawyers might learn more about the public health
law model that is based upon the continuous generation of new
knowledge to protect the health of the community, which
includes all present and future patients. If there is to be real
improvement in reducing the risk of iatrogenic injury to patients,
we must find those improvements in the less than ideal world of
constrained professionals and constrained legal institutions.
Freeing ourselves from the liability model allows us to develop
methods for incorporating the growth of new knowledge for the
benefit of the "system of health" through political negotiation,
new methods of education for professionals, and perhaps
reformulation of some doctrine or agency practices.
We simply do not know enough about the safety within
health care organizations to know what aspects of law are most
in need of reform. A public health perspective, as a heuristic
device, considers the possibility that the least amount of legal
intervention helps to maintain a dynamic equilibrium between
health care delivery and patient safety.

